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ABSTRACT 
 
One of the defining features of the Uniform Commercial Code Article 
9 is the secured creditor’s ability to take possession of the collateral upon 
the debtor’s default “without breach of peace.” This standard is meant to 
protect the debtor from abusive secured creditors, the meaning of which 
has been shaped by courts on a case-by-case basis.  
In reforming their secured transactions laws to enhance access to 
credit, continental legal systems have shown great reception to Article 9 
by adopting the unitary concept and functional approach to security inter-
ests, introducing private enforcement mechanisms, including various 
forms of self-help repossession. However, the “without breach of peace” 
standard seems to be rejected by most national laws and international le-
gal instruments acceded to by civil law countries, to accommodate the 
supposedly alien idea of self-help repossession with civil law tradition.  
Based on comparative analysis of secured transactions laws of the US, 
the UK, Romania, and Hungary (representing national laws), and the 
Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment 
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along with the Aircraft Protocol and the Draft Common Frame of Refer-
ence (representing international legal instruments), this article demon-
strates that continental European legal systems are generally apprehen-
sive with the “without breach of peace” standard. Thus, they are reluctant 
to transplant it to their legislation and try to either modify it or replace it 
with different legal requirements. 
This article concludes that the alternatives of the “without breach of 
peace” standard prevailing in continental legal systems undermine the 
privilege of the secured creditor, pose enforcement problems (such as un-
certainty of creditors’ rights and possible abuses against consumer-debt-
ors), and restrain out-of-court enforcement. 
 
Keywords: enforcement of security right, self-help repossession, without 
breach of peace, judicial repossession, UCC Article 9, Louisiana, access 
to credit, secured creditor, consumer-debtor, civil law 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent years have witnessed a wave of secured transactions law 
reforms in many countries including Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) countries such as Croatia,1 Hungary,2 Poland,3 and Roma-
nia.4  International organizations such as the European Bank for Re-
construction and Development (EBRD) 5 and the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) supplied 
                                                                                                             
 1. See Patricia Živković, Floating Security Interest:Comparative Analysis 
of US, English and Croatian Approaches, in OFFICIAL ALMANAC OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE: THE MILESTONES OF LAW IN THE AREA OF 
CENTRAL EUROPE 2013 1050-1058 (Comenius Univ. 2013).  
 2. Hungary reformed its secured transactions law in 1996 and in 2001, and 
the latest comprehensive reform took place in 2013 with the enactment of the évi 
V. törvény a Polgári Törvénykönyvről (Hungarian Civil Code or HUCC), availa-
ble at https://perma.cc/4327-5LD4. Book Five, Part Three, Title VII, Chapter XXI 
deals with secured transactions. 
 3. See the Polish Law on Registered Pledges and the Pledge Registry (1996), 
arts. 1-14, available at https://perma.cc/P42C-27E6. 
 4. See Tit. VI of Law 99/1999 on Measures for Accelerating Economic Re-
form published in the Official Gazette no. 236/27.05.1999, repealed and replaced 
by Tit. XI, C. Civ. published in the Official Gazette no. 505/15.07.2011. No Eng-
lish translation is available, but the Romanian text is available at https://perma.cc 
/9AVS-HDFS. 
 5. See John L. Simpson et al., Model Law on Secured Transactions, Euro-
pean Bank for Reconstruction & Development (2004), https://perma.cc/JTX6-
UYKP. 
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countries looking to reform their secured transactions laws with 
model laws.6 The International Institute for the Unification of Pri-
vate Law (UNIDROIT) administers international conventions and 
protocols governing secured transactions.7  The conventional wis-
dom has been that Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (here-
inafter Article 9),8 originating in a common law country with ad-
vanced economic and legal systems—the U.S.—is incompatible 
                                                                                                             
 6. See UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions 
(New York, 2010), https://perma.cc/8NGB-K73X. This document contains core 
provisions that UNCITRAL believes any secured transactions should contain. 
States that opt to use the document can make use of it as it is or add to the provi-
sions of the document. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
also published a model law on secured transactions back in 1994. Since it was 
first published, the model law has been widely circulated and has served as a cat-
alyst for defining the essential requirements of a collateral law in a modern market 
economy. It is not intended as detailed legislation for direct incorporation into 
local legal systems, but it has been widely used by the Bank and other institutions 
to support reform projects. For text, see Simpson et al., supra note 5. 
 7. The main UNIDROIT legal instruments governing security rights are the 
Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment (2001), commonly 
referred to as the “Cape Town Convention,” and its three additional protocols, 
i.e., the Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment 
on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment (2001), the Luxembourg Protocol to 
the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Spe-
cific to Railway Rolling Stock (2007), the Protocol to the Convention on Interna-
tional Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to Space Assets (2012), 
and Protocol to the Cape Town Convention on Matters Specific to Agricultural, 
Construction and Mining Equipment (work in progress). For details on these legal 
documents, see UNIDROIT, https://perma.cc/BC2V-EQWY (follow “Instru-
ments;” then follow “Security Interests”).  
 8. First published in 1952, the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is one of 
the longest and most detailed uniform acts and has been adopted by all 50 states 
in the United States in the form of statutes. Prepared by the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) and the American Law In-
stitute (ALI), the UCC in the beginning represented a recommendation of the laws 
that should be adopted by the states. The Permanent Editorial Board was later 
established to continue adapting the UCC to future changes. Although its substan-
tive content in all states is substantially similar, some states have made structural 
modifications to conform to local practices. (In Louisiana, for example, the UCC 
is referred to as a “Louisiana Civil Code.”) UCC Article 9 was significantly re-
vised in 2001, and these substantive revisions have been adopted in every state 
and govern virtually all transactions within the UCC’s scope. They have simpli-
fied the use of personal property as collateral by providing for an almost uniform 
set of rules nationwide. The UCC does not, however, apply to real estate transac-
tions. For a brief summary of UCC Article 9’s creation of a personal security 
interest, see Philip L. Kunkel et al., Security Interests in Personal Property, FARM 
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with civil legal tradition. Recent national secured transactions law 
reforms defy this wisdom. Moreover, international legal instruments 
and model laws that represent major rapprochement of civil law and 
common law traditions in the field of secured transactions law have 
emerged.  
The purpose of this article is to explain the reception of Article 
9 in different civilian legal systems and the underlying reasons for 
that reception in legal instruments inheriting some aspects of Article 
9. Most importantly, this article analyses the place of self-help re-
possession in the continental countries and the seemingly inevitable 
“without breach of peace” standard, which they replace with differ-
ent legal requirements. It argues that the approach taken toward self-
help repossession in European systems does not only have the effect 
of causing unpredictability in enforcement of security rights and of 
discouraging private enforcement mechanisms, but may also have 
adverse consequences on access to credit.  
Two features make this article unique compared to any other 
predecessor. First, while previous works address whether self-help 
repossession is available under and/or compatible with civilian legal 
systems,9 this article contends that self-help repossession is already 
a part of many civilian legal systems. Instead, it focuses on why the 
“breach of peace standard,” which is an inherent part of the device 
under U.S. law, tends to be disregarded by continental systems. Sec-
ond, in previous works, the civilian perspective on self-help repos-
session was based solely on the experience of the state of Louisiana 
while continental European jurisdictions have been widely ig-
nored.10 However, since continental European countries have now 
                                                                                                             
LEGAL SERIES—UNIVIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA EXTENSION (June 2015), 
https://perma.cc/M5EZ-4DXZ. 
 
 9. See, e.g., Bruce V. Schewe, Civilian Thoughts on U.C.C. Section 9-503 
Self-Help Repossession: Reasoning in a Historical Vacuum, 42 LA. L. REV. 239 
(1981). 
 10. Id. 
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showed what can be considered a paradigm shift in the field of se-
cured transactions law, by reforming their laws in line with Article 
9, this article analyses the topic by emphasizing recent develop-
ments and provides a broader perspective on civil law jurisdictions, 
supported by concrete evidence. 
II. THE RECEPTION OF ARTICLE 9 AS MODEL LAW IN NATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS 
Secured transactions laws across the globe can be classified into 
two main categories: the unitary model and the non-unitary (frag-
mented model). The unitary model is represented by Article 9, the 
secured transactions laws of Australia, New Zealand, common law 
provinces of Canada, and the new comers Malawi,11 Sierra Leone,12 
and Liberia.13 These countries where “all secured transactions on 
personal property and fixtures are brought under the same roof, if a 
transaction ‘in substance secures payment and performance of an 
obligation . . . regardless its form or who has title to the collateral,’” 
are referred to as the “Unitary Systems.”14 However, the unitary 
                                                                                                             
 11. Malawi enacted the Personal Property Security Interests Act of April 
2013 and joined the unitary systems of the African front. The pdf version of the 
Act is available at https://perma.cc/KLT8-Q5X6. 
 12. The Act is named the “Borrowers and Lenders Act.” For information, see 
S.U. Thoronka, Parliament Ratifies Borrowers, Lenders Act, GLOBAL TIMES SI-
ERRA LEONE, Nov. 19, 2014, https://perma.cc/NDU4-5KFW. 
 13. See Chapter 5 of the Liberian Commercial Code of 2010 (Secured Trans-
actions Law), https://perma.cc/D2CR-AAUT.  
 14. See Tibor Tajti, Could Continental Europe Adopt A Uniform Commercial 
Code Article 9-Type Secured Transactions System? The Effects of the Differing 
Legal Platforms, 35 ADELAIDE L. REV. 149-50 (2014). Tajti claims that: 
With the entry into force of the Australian Personal Property Securities 
Act 2009 (Cth) (‘APPSA’) in 2012, the Unitary Model of secured trans-
actions law on personal property became part of the legal system of an-
other major economy of the world. The quintessential feature and inno-
vation of this model is the so-called unitary concept of security interest, 
bringing all secured transactions on personal property and fixtures under 
the same roof if a transaction ‘in substance secures payment and perfor-
mance of an obligation . . . regardless of its form or who has title to the 
collateral.’ Although there are meaningful differences among the juris-
dictions that have taken over this model with adaptations to local condi-
tions and expectations, the building blocks and crucial features—in par-
ticular the unitary concept of security interests—remain the same. 
Hence, it makes sense to refer to these jurisdictions as ‘Unitary Systems.’ 
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model and the functional approach are not only adopted by the afore-
mentioned common law countries, but also by civil law countries 
such as Hungary and Romania, or by soft laws such as the Draft 
Common Frame of Reference (DCFR)15 and international legal in-
struments such as the Cape Town Convention on International In-
terests in Mobile Equipment.  
The key characteristics of the non-unitary model are the exist-
ence of numerous legal devices that in reality secure performance of 
obligations, but are not considered security devices, or even if they 
are considered security devices, different sets of rules apply to their 
creation, public notice (if at all required), as well as to their enforce-
ment. The implications of this model are threefold. First, there is no 
single statute (or code) that provides for a comprehensive concept 
                                                                                                             
The group includes, besides Australia, the United States (the birthplace 
of the model), the Canadian provinces and New Zealand. One should 
also add to this list Book IX of the sui generis soft law instrument named 
the ‘Draft Common Frame of Reference’ (‘DCFR’) because it represents 
that farthest reaching project made in the direction of the Unitary Model 
in Europe. 
Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting CRAIG WAPPETT, ESSENTIAL PERSONAL PROP-
ERTY SECURITIES IN AUSTRALIA xxvii (2012)) (citing STUDY GROUP ON A EURO-
PEAN CIVIL CODE & RESEARCH GROUP ON EC PRIVATE LAW (ACQUIS GROUP), 
PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: 
DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR) (Outline ed., Christian von Bar 
et al. eds. 2009), available at https://perma.cc/SAR4-NDKW [hereinafter STUDY 
GROUP]). 
 15. The Draft Common Frame of Reference came out of a European-level 
project aimed at finding the common core of European private law. It is a soft law 
of the common principles of the laws of European countries. The outline edition 
of the text of the 648-page document, entitled “Principles, Definitions and Model 
Rules of European Private Law,” referred to in a shorthand manner as the Draft 
Common Frame of Reference (“DCFR”). The law of security interests as en-
shrined in the DCFR organized security interests following the unitary system. 
All modern security devices that are intended to be included are contained in one 
document. Thus, Book IX, section 1:101 of the DCFR states that: 
(1) This Book applies to the following rights in movable property based 
upon contracts for proprietary security: (a) security rights; and (b) own-
ership retained under retention of ownership devices. (2) The rules of 
this Book on security rights apply with appropriate adaptations to: (a) 
rights under a trust for security purposes; (b) security rights in movable 
assets created by unilateral juridical acts; and (c) security rights in mov-
able assets implied by patrimonial law, if and in so far as this is compat-
ible with the purpose of the law. 
STUDY GROUP, supra note 14, at 447.  
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of security interests rather security devices are scattered in various 
statutes.16 Second, different statutes provide different sets of rules 
for creation, filing (if at all required), and enforcement. Lastly, cer-
tain devices are not considered security devices and thus are not cov-
ered by secured transactions law. The consequence of such a frag-
mented approach to security interests is a lack of consistent and uni-
form rules of creation, registration, and enforcement of security 
rights. This leads to the inefficiency of the secured transactions legal 
regime.  
The non-unitary model has been the dominant model in conti-
nental legal systems such as France, Italy, Germany, and others that 
have not recently reformed their secured transactions law. The UK, 
although being a common-law country, also falls into this category. 
Nevertheless, recent reforms in Hungary and Romania led to the de-
parture of some civilian systems from the non-unitary model, thus 
breaking with their former traditions and moving toward the unitary 
model. 
Finally, in the unitary systems, despite slight variations, the fun-
damental building blocks and features remain close, if not the 
same.17 For instance, Hungarian secured transactions law, following 
a functional approach brings retention of title to the realm of secured 
transactions, but does not re-characterize financial leasing as se-
cured transactions, dedicating separate provisions for the latter.18 
Similar patterns can be noticed showing variations in the degree to 
which the functional approach is adopted. However, the idea that 
transactions that purport to secure performance of obligations 
should be brought under the realm of secured transactions law is 
                                                                                                             
 16.  EMERGING FINANCIAL MARKETS AND SECURED TRANSACTIONS 6 
(Joseph J. Norton & Mads Andenas eds. 1998).  
 17. Tajti asserts that “[a]lthough there are meaningful differences among the 
jurisdictions that have taken over this model with adaptations to local conditions 
and expectations, the building blocks and crucial features—in particular the uni-
tary concept of security interests—remain the same.” Tajti, supra note 14, at 150. 
 18. Polgári Törvénykönyv (Civil Code), Book VI, Chapter LIX, Sections 
6:409 et seq. are dedicated to financial leasing agreements. 
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echoed across the jurisdictions that can be categorized under the uni-
tary model.  
With the above background on the reception of Article 9 in other 
jurisdictions, it ought to be inquired why Article 9 is being accepted 
as a model for secured transactions law. The reason is simple. Arti-
cle 9 creates a very simple and efficient system. Under Article 9, the 
fact that the same rules of creation, perfection, and enforcement ap-
ply to all transactions purporting to secure performance of obliga-
tion comes with efficiency benefits. In other words, Article 9 is 
based on the idea that the cost of transaction for creation, filing, and 
enforcement of security interests must be low.  
Due to the functional approach to security interests adopted by 
Article 9, the formal label of the transaction becomes irrelevant and 
only the economic reality behind the transaction determines whether 
Article 9 applies to it. This reduces the cost of transaction that would 
be incurred in attempting to define its precise nature or the cost in-
curred when an agreed upon transaction is ruled invalid based on 
mere formality.19 Hence, for instance, whether the transaction is la-
beled as “title financing” or “consignment,” the creditor is not de-
prived of its secured creditor status. This means that if the consignor 
files the transaction under Article 9, he or she is a secured creditor 
without regard to the fact that the transaction is not labeled as “se-
                                                                                                             
 19. FORMS UNDER THE REVISED UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9 
(2d ed., Cindy J. Chemuchin ed., ABA 2009). Chemuchin maintains that: 
The form of the transaction or the label the parties put on the transaction 
is irrelevant for the purpose of determining whether Article 9 applies. 
Rather, the determination of whether Article 9 applies is based on the 
economic reality of the transactions. For example, transactions may be 
characterized as a sale or lease of goods but if in economic reality secu-
rity interest is being created, Article 9 will nevertheless apply . . . it is 
also not required that the parties refer in their agreement to a ‘security 
interest’ being created under a ‘security agreement.’ Even if parties use 
terms such as ‘assignment,’ ‘hypothecation,’ ‘conditional sales,’ ‘trust 
deed,’ the like, Article 9 still applies whenever security interest in per-
sonal property is being created. Similarly, it is irrelevant for the purpose 
of Article 9, whether title to the collateral is in the name of the debtor or 
the secured party. 
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curity agreement.” The filing requirement that is imposed univer-
sally on the great majority of transactions ensures that third parties 
do not have to incur the cost of inquiring the status of the potential 
debtor’s property other than checking at the filing office or search-
ing electronically where applicable. Once the third parties discover 
the existence of the security interest on the debtor’s asset from the 
relevant public record, they have to inquire about the specific details 
from the debtor. The secured creditor has an obligation to endorse 
any information provided by the debtor to ensure that the third party 
has accurate information.20 If the debtor refuses to provide the in-
formation or the secured creditor refuses to endorse the information 
provided by the debtor, it is sufficient warning for the third party of 
the risk of dealing with the debtor. 
Article 9’s filing system along with other methods of perfection 
tackle the ostensible ownership problem where publicly known 
transactions lead third parties to believe that the property is unen-
cumbered or belongs to the debtor. Ostensible ownership is a serious 
problem in Germany, for instance, regarding retention of title trans-
actions that are not subject to registration despite the rule protecting 
a good faith third party acquiring rights in the encumbered asset of 
the debtor.21 Hence, whether the property in the possession of the 
                                                                                                             
 20. U.C.C. Section 9-210(b) states the following:  
Subject to subsections (c), (d), (e), and (f), a secured party, other than a 
buyer of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory 
notes or a consignor, shall comply with a request within 14 days after 
receipt: (1) in the case of a request for an accounting, by authenticating 
and sending to the debtor an accounting; and (2) in the case of a request 
regarding a list of collateral or a request regarding a statement of account, 
by authenticating and sending to the debtor an approval or correction. 
U.C.C. § 9-210(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). 
 21. Jens Hausmann, The Value of Public-Notice Filing Under Uniform 
Commercial Code Article 9: A Comparison with the German Legal System of 
Securities in Personal Property, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 427, 474 (1996). In 
Germany, there are limitations on the protection afforded to a good-faith third 
party. These limitations are that the subsequent acquirer in good faith must have 
been deceived by ostensible ownership, that the subsequent acquirer must have 
secured actual possession permanently—temporary transfer of possession does 
not suffice—and that the subsequent acquirer must demonstrate that his or her 
lack of knowledge of an existing right is not the result of his or her negligence. 
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debtor actually belongs to the debtor is a matter of guesswork. This 
entails significant transaction costs, a concern to which Article 9 in-
spired laws respond through a comprehensive perfection method, 
mainly with filing.  
Lastly, the enforcement regime favors private enforcement 
methods through private disposition of the collateral unlike a court 
administered sale, the former being faster, cheaper, and commer-
cially sensible.22 Self-help repossession, which allows the creditor 
to repossess the collateral without assistance of the court, subject to 
the “without breach of peace standard,” plays a significant role in 
making the enforcement of security rights quicker and cheaper, 
therefore more efficient.23 Hence, without further ado, on the ques-
tion why developing countries belonging to the civil law system are 
receptive to Article 9, one must conclude that it is because it incor-
porates efficiency at its heart, eases access to credit, which in its turn 
fosters economic development.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
These are limitations to the priority right of a good-faith third party make osten-
sible ownership a serious problem in Germany because the subsequent third party 
can invoke his or her good faith only in such limited circumstances. See id. at 470-
72. 
 22. Laurence M. Smith explains that “[a] secured party sale under Article 9 
of the U.C.C. is a means by which a secured lender can realize on the debtor’s 
collateral, without the need to institute litigation or bankruptcy proceedings. It is 
expeditious, cost-effective and free of the adverse publicity that frequently ac-
companies a bankruptcy filing.” Laurence M. Smith, Secured Party Sales Under 
U.C.C. Article 9: A Commonsense Solution to Maximize a Recovery, 6 PRATT’S 
J. BANKR. L. 37, 42 (2010). 
 23. CĂTĂLIN GABRIEL STĂNESCU, SELF-HELP, PRIVATE DEBT COLLECTION 
AND THE CONCOMITANT RISKS: A COMPARATIVE LAW ANALYSIS 1 (2015): 
It is then relevant to bring forth into discussion the effectiveness of the 
traditional judicial methods of debt recovery as compared to alternative 
means, which are arguably better, cheaper and faster when considering 
the creditors’ needs, as well as the efficiency of consumer-debtor protec-
tion mechanisms in place in the chosen jurisdictions, when considering 
the debtor’s needs. 
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III. SELF-HELP REPOSSESSION AND THE “WITHOUT BREACH OF 
PEACE” STANDARD UNDER ARTICLE 9 
The secured creditor can take possession of the collateral ac-
cording to UCC Section 9-609 either judicially24 or non-judicially.25 
When the creditor pursues non-judicial self-help repossession, it is 
under the duty to repossess “without breach of peace.”26 The “with-
out breach of peace” standard is undefined by Article 9 and is left to 
ex post facto determination by the courts.27 The “without breach of 
peace” standard is intended to safeguard the debtor from abuses that 
can occur during self-help repossession.  
Determining the existence of a breach of peace is difficult in 
most circumstances. This difficulty seems to be the underlining rea-
son for which continental systems are reluctant to embrace it in their 
secured transactions laws. Therefore, the following brief overview 
of the various circumstances under which courts faced this issue 
serves as a stepping-stone for the rest of this article. 
There are circumstances where the determination of breach of 
peace is easier and clear cut, such as in cases involving physical as-
sault by the repossessor. The task becomes challenging in cases re-
sulting in infliction of emotional distress on the debtor or when the 
self-help repossession took place through tactics such as the help of 
                                                                                                             
 24. There are primarily two channels of judicial repossession. These are an 
action for replevin and an action for writ of possession. Depending on the state 
law in question, the secured creditor has an option to resort to one of them. In 
either case, a state official, i.e., a sheriff or a Marshal executes the repossession 
on behalf of the secured creditor. See WILLIAM D. WARREN & STEVEN D. WALT, 
SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 277 (2007). 
 25. U.C.C. Section 9-609(a)-(b) states the following:  
(a) After default, the secured party: (1) may take possession of the col-
lateral; and (2) without removal, may render equipment unusable and 
dispose of collateral on a debtor’s premises under Section 9-610. (b) A 
secured party may proceed under subsection (a): (1) pursuant to judicial 
process; or (2) without judicial process, if it proceeds without breach of 
the peace. 
U.C.C. § 9-609(a)-(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Ryan McRobert, Defining “Breach of the Peace” in Self-Help 
Repossessions, 87 WASH. L. REV. 569 (2012). 
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a law enforcement officer or when the repossession has emotional 
impact on third parties, such as children of the debtor.28 
In the US, court decisions have been inconsistent with regard to 
determining the occurrence of breach of peace across states.29 The 
typical instance where courts agree that breach of peace occurred is 
the use of physical assault during the repossession.30 Court decisions 
in borderline cases such as those involving: trespass, the mere pres-
ence of a law enforcement officer, emotional harm inflicted on third 
parties, and verbal objection by the debtor during the repossession 
have been inconsistent.31 The inconsistency in court decisions on 
breach of peace in the US leads to unpredictability for creditors in-
volved in interstate trade.32 Thus, McRoberts argues that leaving Ar-
ticle 9’s “without breach of peace” standard undefined defeats the 
very purpose of the UCC.33 
                                                                                                             
 28. Id. at 570-71. McRobert asks several questions showing a number of sce-
narios in which the determination of breach of peace can be a daunting task: 
For example, if a repossession agent asks the police to provide him with 
protection as he repossesses a vehicle, is this a breach of the peace that 
makes the self-help repossession unlawful? Does a breach of the peace 
occur when a homeowner assaults someone trespassing on his property 
in an effort to repossess lawn furniture? Imagine that the same home-
owner does not notice his property being repossessed, but the creditor 
has to cut a lock and bypass a gate to repossess the property. Does this 
breach the peace even if there is no confrontation? What if the debtor 
experiences emotional distress or something happens to a neutral third 
party? 
 29. Id. at 578-94. 
 30. For example, the Arkansas Supreme Court has held that violence is 
breach of the peace. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Herring, 589 S.W.2d 584, 586 
(Ark. 1979). Similarly, the Tennessee Court of Appeals has held that breach of 
the peace must involve violence. See McCall v. Owens, 820 S.W.2d 748, 751 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).  
 31. McRobert, supra note 27, at 582-91. See Chapa v. Traciers & Assocs., 
267 S.W.3d 386 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008). In this case, the repossession agent repos-
sessed a vehicle without knowing that the debtor’s two young children were in the 
back seats. The repossessor returned the children after a while. The Texas Court 
of Appeals held that even though the children were diagnosed with post-traumatic 
stress, the repossession was not in breach of the peace irrespective of the harm to 
the third party. The Court disregarded what happened after repossession and fo-
cused on the nature of the repossession.  
 32. McRobert, supra note 27, at 587. 
 33. Id.: 
The courts should have a legal framework that allows them to consist-
ently apply the law. Debtors and creditors should be able to understand 
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However, the practical problems faced in attempting to apply the 
“without breach of peace” call for reform, not for abandoning the 
standard altogether. In response to the inconsistency of court deci-
sions defining the breach of peace and the ensuing unpredictability, 
McRoberts recommends the amendment of Article 9 to include a 
two-stage determination of the breach of peace. In his opinion, the 
first stage should include a list of three per se violation factors while 
the second stage contains a set of two factors to be determined on a 
case by case basis,34 although the feasibility of such a proposal is 
debatable. 
A last point worth mentioning is that under Article 9, violation 
of the “breach of peace standard” has serious repercussions. These 
are criminal liability (in cases of grave breach, such as physical as-
sault), compensatory damages, statutory and punitive damages as 
well as loss of the right to deficiency claim (payment).35 
                                                                                                             
the law surrounding breach of the peace so they are able to properly re-
possess property and correctly ascertain when a breach of the peace has 
occurred. Moreover, companies or individuals who engage in reposses-
sions in multiple jurisdictions should not have to perform extensive legal 
research in order to understand the relevant standards governing their 
right to self-help repossession. This is completely unnecessary and con-
trary to the purpose of the Uniform Commercial Code.” (footnote omit-
ted) (citing Karl N. Llewellyn, Problems of Codifying Security Law, 13 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 687 (1948)). 
 34. Id. at 594: 
The UCC’s failure to define “breach of the peace” has produced consid-
erable uncertainty and inconsistency in the scope of lawful self-help re-
possession. In order to remedy this situation, the UCC should incorporate 
the proposed two-part test that coherently defines “breach of the peace” 
in a manner that balances the interests of the debtor, creditor, and public 
at large. This two-part test first identifies three categories of conduct that 
constitute a per se breach of peace. A breach of the peace necessarily 
occurs if: (1) there is any use of law enforcement during the reposses-
sion; (2) there is any violence or threat of violence; or (3) there is any 
unheeded verbal request to cease the repossession. If none of the per se 
rules have been violated, then courts should proceed to the second part 
of the test, which requires consideration of the degree of trespass in-
volved and any impact on third parties. This test will create greater con-
sistency and predictability for debtors and creditors, and ensure a safer 
environment for the public. 
We find McRobert’s entire analysis and conclusion valid. 
 35. See U.C.C. § 9-625 et seq. (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). 
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IV. TERMINOLOGICAL CAVEAT 
Self-help repossession is a designation used by Article 9 and se-
cured transactions laws influenced by it. Terminological variations 
across jurisdictions are inevitable, given the fact that the legal sys-
tems that transplanted it did not retain all of its original features. 
Under the Hungarian secured transactions law and the DCFR, for 
instance, due to the substantial peculiarities of the private enforce-
ment mechanism they enshrined, it is difficult to refer to “self-help 
repossession.” It is rather an out-of-court (non-judicial or extra-ju-
dicial) enforcement of a security right. Hence, self-help reposses-
sion, as one form of non-judicial enforcement procedure, is used 
strictly to mean the right of the secured creditor to take possession 
of the collateral without the involvement of a state agent.  
There are two contexts in which the terms out-of-court, extra-
judicial, or non-judicial enforcement are used interchangeably. The 
first is when different types of private enforcement mechanisms that 
do not involve state authority are being referred to. These include 
self-help repossession, strict foreclosure, and private sale of collat-
eral. The second context is when the procedure being addressed does 
not qualify as self-help repossession in the strict sense. 
V. THE ABHORRENCE OF SELF-HELP REPOSSESSION IN CIVIL LAW 
SYSTEMS—THE STATE OF LOUISIANA: WHERE IT ALL STARTED 
The intricate relationship of civil law systems with self-help re-
possession begins in the U.S., in the state of Louisiana36 where self-
help repossession faced challenges based on two major grounds. The 
first challenge came from the 14th Amendment due process clause.37 
                                                                                                             
 36. For detailed insight into Louisiana’s legal tradition, see A.N. 
Yiannopoulos, The Civil Codes of Lousiana, 1 CIV. L. COMMENT. 1, 1 (2008), at 
https://perma.cc/2UU2-JRLA.   
 37. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause states: “nor shall any 
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law….” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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While the second one stemmed from public policy based on “Loui-
siana’s traditional civil law hostility to self-help” that self-help re-
possession is considered to violate.38 
Even before the implementation of the UCC, it was projected 
that Article 9 self-help repossession might face constitutional chal-
lenges in Louisiana where self-help repossession in the creditor-
debtor relationship has been regarded as incompatible with the legal 
system in place, on the grounds of an alleged violation of due pro-
cess.39 This challenge was ultimately rejected by the Supreme Court 
of Louisiana, which held that self-help repossession was constitu-
tional.40 The challenge contended that the 14th Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution prohibits deprivation of property by the state with-
out due process of law.41 The court held that because the 14th 
Amendment requires only state action to comply with due process 
                                                                                                             
 38. Paul Joseph Ory, Nonjudicial Disposition Under Louisiana Commercial 
Law Chapter Nine, 51 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1254 (1991).  
 39. Schewe, supra note 9, at 267 (footnote omitted) (quoting Lee Hargrave, 
The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 LA. L. REV. 
1, 4 (1974)):  
In Louisiana, the incorporation may never occur. In the short run the util-
ity of such an enactment is dubious since it would likely prove to be the 
catalyst for rounds of litigation. Assuming that the Federal Constitution 
is interpreted so as to uphold 9-503 and 9-504, difficulties would remain 
under article I, section 2 of the Louisiana Constitution. Unshackled by 
the state action limitation and as ‘a flexible provision which gives the 
courts significant leeway in developing standards of reasonableness,’ ar-
ticle I, section 2 may be viewed as an articulation of the civilian ideas of 
protection of private property. If a Louisiana creditor, acting under the 
authority of the U.C.C. in a manner historically associated with the gov-
ernment, engages in self-help, such conduct should be deemed to be vi-
olative of the tenets of civilian due process. 
 40. Price v. U-Haul Co. of Louisiana, 745 So. 2d 593 (La. 1999), available 
at https://perma.cc/945S-GVY2. 
 41. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state 
wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
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and self-help repossession was a private action, it did not violate the 
due process clause.42 The Supreme Court of Louisiana also rejected 
the argument that by enacting a statute allowing the exercise of dep-
rivation of property by private entities (which amounted to a dele-
gation of state powers and constituted a veritable privatization of 
enforcement), self-help repossession should also be subject to due 
process requirements.43  
Another long-standing challenge to self-help repossession, 
which defined self-help repossession as it appears today in Louisi-
ana, emanated from the incompatibility of self-help repossession 
with the Louisianan policy of keeping public peace.44 On multiple 
occasions, courts in Louisiana refused to affirm self-help reposses-
sion on the grounds that it is against public peace or order.45  
Pursuant to the above, Louisiana generally banned self-help re-
possession except when the debtor has abandoned the collateral, sur-
                                                                                                             
 42. See Price v. U-Haul Co. of Louisiana, 745 So. 2d 593 (La. 1999). In the 
Price case, it is stated by way of background discussion that: 
An essential requirement in any due process challenge is that the claim-
ant must show that some property or liberty interest has been adversely 
affected by state action. Delta Bank & Trust Co. v. Lassiter, 383 So.2d 
330 (La.1980); Lee Hargrave, The Louisiana State Constitution: A Ref-
erence Guide 23 (1991) (state due process guarantee protects against 
governmental, as opposed to private, action). Here, it is disputed plaintiff 
was deprived of rights that are protected by the due process guarantees 
of the federal and state constitutions against state action. The disputed 
issue, decisive of the constitutional challenge, is whether defendants’ in-
voking the Act's provisions to conduct a private seizure and sale of plain-
tiff’s property constituted state action. Defendants contend that their ac-
tion involved purely private seizure and private sale of property, author-
ized by statute and by contract between the parties, and therefore was not 
state action that would implicate constitutional due process principles. 
Id. at 594 (emphasis in original). 
 43. Id.  
 44. Ory, supra note 38, at 1225.  
 45. In Liner v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., for instance, Justice Tate 
indicated that “[t]his [possessory protection in cases of eviction by force or fraud] 
is done in the interest of preservation of peace in society and as a deterrent against 
self-help.” 319 So. 2d 766, 781 (La. 1975) (Tate, J., concurring in denial of re-
hearing). See also Guidry v. Rubin, 425 So. 2d 366, 371 (La. Ct. App. 1982) and 
Grandeson v. International Harvester Credit Corp., 66 So. 2d 317 (La. 1953). 
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rendered it, or has given his or her consent either before or after de-
fault.46 Hence, in Louisiana, the general rule is that the creditor has 
no right to repossess the collateral without court involvement.47 As 
an exception, in Louisiana, self-help repossession is allowed with 
respect to automobiles. Under the revised Additional Defaults Rem-
edies Act, a secured creditor can repossess a vehicle collateral (1) 
by sending notice to the debtor after default,48 (2) by clearly stating 
in the notice that “Louisiana law permits repossession of motor ve-
hicles upon default without further notice or judicial process,” and 
(3) without breaching peace.49   
Besides limiting self-help repossession to vehicle collaterals, 
Louisiana also took further steps. Mainly, unlike under Article 9 that 
leaves the determination of breach of peace to the courts in all cir-
cumstances, the revised Additional Defaults Remedies Act illustra-
tively lists the conditions under which breach of peace occurs. Ac-
cordingly, for instance, there is breach of peace in case of unauthor-
ized entry into the debtor’s premise (locked or unlocked) to conduct 
the repossession or where the repossession takes place despite the 
debtor’s verbal objection.50  
                                                                                                             
 46. Louisiana Revised Statutes Title 10, Section 9-609(a) provides that: 
After default, a secured party may take possession of the collateral only: 
(1) after the debtor’s abandonment, or the debtor’s surrender to the se-
cured party, of the collateral; (2) with the debtor’s consent given after or 
in contemplation of default; (3) pursuant to judicial process; or (4) in 
those cases expressly provided by law other than this Chapter. 
LA. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-609(a) (2001). 
 47. Id. 
 48. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 6:966 (2015). Section 6:966(A)(2) states that: 
Prior to the use of the procedures set forth in this Chapter, a secured party 
shall send notice to all debtors in writing at the last known address of the 
debtors, of the right of the secured party to take possession of the collat-
eral without further notice upon default as defined in R.S. 6:965(C). Such 
notice shall include the debtor’s name, last known address, and descrip-
tion of the collateral and the following in at least twelve-point type . . . . 
LA. STAT. ANN. § 6:966(A)(2) (2015). 
 49. LA. STAT. ANN. § 6:965 (2011), available at https://perma.cc/VU5U-
7AKQ. 
 50. LA. STAT. ANN. § 6:966(A)(2),(B) (2015). Section 6:965(C) provides as 
follows:  
As used in this Chapter, the following terms have the following mean-
ings:  
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It should be noted that under Article 9, court decisions on 
whether a breach of peace occurred in cases of verbal objection by 
the debtor during the repossession have been inconsistent. Some 
courts have ruled that verbal objection does not amount to breach of 
peace.51 By listing the grounds for breach of peace, Louisiana has 
attempted to either avoid or reduce the possibility of the occurrence 
of breach of peace due to ambiguity of the law, in line with its high 
concern for maintaining public peace. While the list may prove to 
be a valuable aid to courts and a possible solution to the uncertainties 
caused by differences of interpretation, serving notice prior to the 
actual repossession of the collateral may undermine the very essence 
of the self-help remedy. These two possibilities should be consid-
ered seriously by weighing the competing interests involved: subject 
self-help repossession to less burdensome conditions or impose 
stricter rules in order to protect the prevailing public policy. Louisi-
ana has chosen the latter path. Despite this, self-help repossession 
and enforcement of security rights seem to function efficiently in 
Louisiana.  
 
                                                                                                             
(1) “Breach of peace” shall include but not be limited to the following:  
(a) Unauthorized entry by a repossessor into a closed dwelling, whether 
locked or unlocked.  
(b) Oral protest by a debtor to the repossessor against repossession prior 
to the repossessor seizing control of the collateral shall constitute a 
breach of the peace by the repossessor. 
LA. STAT. ANN. § 6:965(C) (2011). 
 51. See, e.g., Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Koontz, 661 N.E.2d 1171, 1173–74 
(Ill. Ct. App. 1996). In this case, the debtor protested to repossession by rushing 
out of his house in his underwear and yelled “Don’t take it!” The Appellate Court 
of Illinois found as follows:  
We note that to rule otherwise would be to invite the ridiculous situation 
whereby a debtor could avoid a deficiency judgment by merely stepping 
out of his house and yelling once at a nonresponsive repossessor. Such a 
narrow definition of the conduct necessary to breach the peace would, 
we think, render the self-help repossession statute useless. Therefore, we 
reject Koontz’s invitation to define ‘an unequivocal oral protest,’ without 
more, as a breach of the peace.  
See also Williams v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 674 F.2d 717, 720 (8th Cir. 1982). 
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VI. EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE: EVIDENCE OF STEPS FORWARD 
In civilian legal systems, outside of the US, the perception of 
self-help repossession has been negative. Regarding this, Warren 
and Walt wrote “the Europeans tend to see it as another example of 
American Barbarism: ‘You mean that the creditor can just go out 
and steal the property back?’”52 The criminalization of self-help re-
possession in Germany reflects this perception,53 and so does the 
failure to regulate it in other civil law countries. One possible reason 
self-help repossession has been unknown in the civilian systems is 
that the efficiency of judicial enforcement or the availability of an 
alternative judicial remedy, i.e., judicial repossession renders self-
help repossession unnecessary. However, as shown later, evidence 
does not support this argument. Similarly to the civil law state of 
Louisiana, another reason advanced for rejecting self-help reposses-
sion is its incompatibility with due process of law and public peace 
and order. Even so, the judicial confirmation of self-help reposses-
sion as well as the existence of other covert self-help remedies in 
civilian law54 refute the argument of incompatibility of self-help re-
possession and civilian systems.55 
A. Perception and Reality  
Despite the longstanding perception that self-help repossession 
is incompatible with civil law tradition, there are also counter-ex-
amples manifesting that developing civil law countries, either know-
ingly or unknowingly, have embodied a type of self-help reposses-
                                                                                                             
 52. WARREN & WALT, supra note 24, at 269. 
 53. TIBOR TAJTI, SYSTEMIC AND TOPICAL MAPPING OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF 
THE DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE AND ARBITRATION 134 (2013). 
 54. For details on covert self-help remedies still present in civil law countries, 
see STĂNESCU, supra note 23, at 51-95. 
 55. For details on constitutional challenges to self-help repossession in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, see Alexandra Horváthová et al., Is Self-Help 
Repossession Possible in Central Europe? The Case of Hungary, Romania and 
Slovakia, 4 J. EURASIAN L. 83 (2011). 
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sion into their legal systems. For instance, in some civil law coun-
tries, the lessor can take possession of the leased good by giving 
notice to the lessee upon the lessee’s default. No additional safe-
guard is in place to protect the interests of the lessee who might have 
paid a significant amount of the value of the property.56  
Compared to self-help repossession under Article 9 (subject to 
ex post facto judicial control), the form of self-help repossession, 
hardly noticed in the civil law countries, can have far-reaching con-
sequences on the debtor. One must then reach the conclusion that 
there is a discrepancy between the perception and the reality of self-
help repossession in civil law countries. The permissibility of self-
help repossession in financial leasing is not paid attention to merely 
due to the dogmatic thinking and approach in civil law countries that 
financial leasing is not a secured transaction.57 However, under cer-
tain conditions, financial leasing for all purposes create a security 
                                                                                                             
 56. For instance,  Ethiopia’s (civil law country) Capital Goods Leasing Busi-
ness Proclamation states the following: 
1) Where the lessee defaults in the payment of the rent, or commits an-
other fault which may breach the agreement, the lessor shall grant him a 
period of 30 days for remedying the default so far as the default may be 
remedied.  
2) Where the lessee does not remedy the default within the period spec-
ified in sub-Article  
(1) of this Article, the lessor may rescind the agreement, repossess the 
leased capital goods and claim related damages. 
Capital Goods Leasing Business Proclamation No. 103/1998, Part Two, Article 
(6), Negarit Gazeta 710. Hence, the lessor has a statutory right to repossess the 
collateral if thirty days’ notice was served upon the debtor. The possibility that 
the debtor might have paid ninety percent of the value of the leased good is irrel-
evant. This makes the device harsh for debtors under the financial leasing law. 
The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) also 
administers an international financial leasing law that allows the lessor to take 
possession of the collateral up on the lessee’s default. See UNIDROIT Convention 
on International Financial Leasing art. 13, opened for signature May 28, 1988, 
2321 U.N.T.S. 41556. This convention is effective in civil law countries such as 
Hungary, Italy, and France. For the status of the convention, see Status— UNI-
DROIT Convention on International Financial Leasing (Ottawa, 1988), 
https://perma.cc/2DK2-BZQE (last updated June 28, 2017). 
 57. Under the U.C.C., a leasing is a secured transaction if it meets the follow-
ing noncumulative criteria:  
(a) it is not subject to termination by the lessee and (b) at least one of 
four listed situations is present. These are (i) that the original term of the 
lease equals or exceeds the remaining economic life of the asset, (ii) that 
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right in favor of the lessor on the lease, as a result of which it is re-
characterized as secured transactions in countries that adopted the 
functional approach to security interest.58 Consequently, the permis-
sibility of self-help repossession in financial leasing implies that 
self-help repossession has been part of civil law tradition in a field, 
which is essentially similar to secured transactions.    
B. The United Kingdom: Is the “Breach of Peace Standard” Used 
to Vanquish Self-Help Repossession? 
The presence of the United Kingdom59 in an analysis dedicated 
to the “without breach of peace” standard in continental systems 
might be surprising and somehow unfit, given the fact that all of the 
countries in this analysis belong to the civil law tradition. However, 
although England and Wales are obviously common-law jurisdic-
tions, they have been in constant contact with civilian systems due 
to the United Kingdom’s EU membership and adhesion to the acquis 
communautaire. Since it is also the only European jurisdiction (be-
sides Romania), where the “without breach of peace standard” is 
                                                                                                             
the lessee is bound to renew for the remaining economic life or to be-
come the owner of the asset, (iii) that the lessee may renew for the re-
maining economic life for no or nominal additional payment, and (iv) 
that the lessee may become the owner at the end of the lease term for no 
or nominal additional payment. 
Herbert Kronke, Financial Leasing, and its Unification by UNIDROIT – General 
Report, 16 UNIF. L. REV. 23, 29 (2011) (citing U.C.C. § 1-203(b) (AM. LAW INST. 
& UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010)).  
 At the same time, in a recent case in Romania involving a five-year-long fi-
nancial leasing contract, the court of first instance of Bucharest’s First District 
held that the provisions of Law 99/1999 governing Romanian secured transac-
tions, are inapplicable with respect to leasing. The ruling is in complete contra-
diction to the provisions of Article 2 of the Law, which clearly state that financial 
leasing contracts concluded for a period longer than a year are governed by Law 
99/1999. Moreover, despite obvious errors made by the court of first instance in 
the understanding and interpretation of the law, the Bucharest Tribunal dismissed 
the appeal and upheld the decision. See Decisions no. 24877/17.12.2015 and 
4064/22.11.2016 rendered in case no. 66094/299/2014, unpublished, at 
https://perma.cc/PQA6-GFPV and https://perma.cc/E58K-PUYW. 
 58. See Kronke, supra note 57, at 29. 
 59. Although we refer to the United Kingdom as one jurisdiction, the ensuing 
analysis focuses mostly on the law of England and Wales. 
2017] CIVIL LAW SYSTEMS & UCC ARTICLE 9 121 
 
 
 
(still) upheld, the authors deemed the inclusion of English law to be 
beneficial for the purposes of this article.  
It must be stated at the outset that the position of British com-
mentators, such as Roy Goode, does not differ much from that of 
their U.S. peers, even though the UK does not have a secured trans-
action law that resembles the unitary model advocated by Article 9. 
However, Goode underlines that a creditor who exercises his or her 
right to repossession “must take the greatest care not to commit any 
of the numerous offences that lie in store for him,” and “where the 
exercise to self-help involves the use of violence against the person 
or property of another, it ceases to operate.”60 
This is pretty much where the certainty regarding self-help re-
possession and the “without breach of peace” standard ends. Bridge 
states that “the law has been somewhat equivocal about whether in-
dividuals may exercise self-help as a remedy instead of pursuing 
their grievances in court,” especially with respect to personal prop-
erty where “the law on self-help falls significantly short of standards 
of clarity and consistency.”61 Like all other jurisdictions, Britain 
also lacks a definition of the standard, which leaves the task to the 
courts that will decide on a case-by-case basis. The explanation for 
this trait of common law systems might reside in their court system. 
Unlike civil law courts, which are bound to interpret and apply the 
existing law, common law courts are also creators of law. Thus, 
common law courts enjoy more freedom and flexibility in applying 
the rules on a case-by-case basis, while their civilian counterparts 
require clear(er) guidelines.  
                                                                                                             
 60. ROY GOODE ET AL., GOODE: CONSUMER CREDIT LAW AND PRACTICE (1st 
ed. 1999 & Supp. 26, 2008, Roy Goode ed.). 
 61. MICHAEL BRIDGE, PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW 121 (4th ed., Paul Craig 
ed., Oxford U. Press 2015). 
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Self-help repossession is known in the UK under the term “re-
caption,”62 a right which is “constrained by the limitation that rea-
sonable means be employed.”63 In Michael Bridge’s reading, these 
reasonable means require the creditor to serve a notice to the wrong-
ful possessor of the collateral of his or her intention to recover it.  
Additional attention should be given to the notice requirement 
in the UK, for its presence here might be surprising. In the UK, the 
Consumer Credit Act (CCA) 1974 introduced a series of rules de-
signed to protect consumers who became indebted under regulated 
agreements, but since most of them proved inefficient, the CCA 
2006 had to come up with extra provisions designed to make sure 
that all consumers in arrears receive default notices, in order to un-
derstand their position.64 In 2014, as the Financial Conduct Author-
ity (FCA) took over consumer credit regulation, the CCA was dou-
bled by secondary legislation, the Consumer Credit Sourcebook 
(CONC), meant to strengthen the protection of consumer debtors 
from unfair debt collection practices.65 
These provisions served to delay the creditor from enforcing his 
or her rights until certain formalities are complied with.66 Creditors 
must provide debtors with notices before they can terminate an 
agreement, recover possession of any good, or enforce any secu-
rity.67 In those cases where there has been a breach of contract by 
the debtor, under the 2006 amendments, it must be provided with 14 
                                                                                                             
 62. J.K. MACLEOD, CONSUMER SALES LAW 759 (2d ed., Routledge-
Cavendish 2007). 
 63. BRIDGE, supra note 61, at 121. 
 64. MACLEOD, supra note 62, at 813. See also COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER 
LAW 527 (Michael Furmston & Jason Chuah eds. 2010) and HUGH BEALE ET AL., 
THE LAW OF SECURITY AND TITLE-BASED FINANCING 918 (2d ed. 2012). 
 65. See FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, CONSUMER CREDIT SOURCE-
BOOK, ch. 7 (2017).   
 66. GEOFF HARDING, CONSUMER CREDIT AND CONSUMER HIRE LAW: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE 111 (1995). See also COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW, su-
pra note 64, at 527.  
 67. HARDING, supra note 66, at 112. See also FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHOR-
ITY, supra note 65, at arts 7.17 et seq. 
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days (under CCA 1974, there were only 7) to cure the breach.68 
Three extra arrears notices are provided for the benefit of debtors 
who have made at least two installment payments,69 to be served at 
the expense of the creditor. Default notices are not required when 
the creditor is simply looking for recovery of arrears of instalments, 
but only when it claims damages for breach, enforcement of the 
agreement or repossession.70 Similarly, no notice is required in the 
case of non-commercial, unsecured agreements.71 
The purpose of the default notices is to assist the debtor in re-
solving his or her difficulties. In the case of supply of goods, a de-
fault notice also suspends the right of the creditor to immediately 
take possession of the goods.72 In other words, the possession of the 
debtor over the collateral is still legitimate since the right of the cred-
itor to repossess is on hold. Obviously, these notices established by 
the CCA 2006 may have the perverse effect of prolonging non-pay-
ment, but failure to provide them in the prescribed form deprives the 
creditor of his or her right to enforce and ask for interest on the 
amounts due or the default sum.73 Although the consequences seem 
harsh, they are a reaction to the failure of the CCA 1974 to provide 
efficient redress to aggrieved debtors for not receiving notice, thus 
forcing them to seek action in common law for conversion or wrong-
ful taking of possession.74 
                                                                                                             
 68. IAIN RAMSAY, CONSUMER LAW AND POLICY: TEXT AND MATERIALS ON 
REGULATING CONSUMER MARKETS 474 (3d ed., Hart Publ'g 2012). The fourteen-
day term is maintained by the Consumer Credit sourcebook. See FINANCIAL CON-
DUCT AUTHORITY, supra note 65, at art. 7.17.4. 
 69. The protection afforded to debtors who have made payments is similar in 
purpose to the sixty-percent rule available under the U.C.C. Given that United 
Kingdom consumers must prove payment of only two installments, however, the 
protection available to them is much broader than that available to United States 
consumers.  
 70. A.G. GUEST ET AL., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSUMER CREDIT LAW 2086 § 
1 (Thomson Reuters 2009). 
 71. Id. See, e.g., Consumer Credit Act 1974, c. 39, §§ 86C(7), 86E(8) (UK).  
 72. MACLEOD, supra note 62, at 815. 
 73. Id. at 814. COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW, supra note 64, at 527. 
 74. RAMSAY, supra note 68, at 474. 
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Upon receiving the notice, the debtor has two options, to either 
comply or not. If he or she complies in full75 before the established 
date for that purpose, then the breach is cured and treated as if it 
never occurred. In the case that the debtor does not comply within 
the given term, the suspension of the creditor’s rights ends and he or 
she may now resort to the termination of the agreement, reposses-
sion of the goods, and levy of a default charge. In fact, although 
being a common-law jurisdiction (generally favorable to self-help 
remedies), the UK has the most detailed regulation of default notices 
compared to the rest of the jurisdictions analyzed. Therefore, the 
CCA appears as a very paternalistic and over-protective regime for 
consumer debtors in the after default and pre-repossession period. 
When analyzing the requirement of prior notice, Michael Bridge 
concludes that in the absence of clear statutory standards and given 
the uncertainty of the repossession’s aftermath, “the continuing ob-
scurity of the right may therefore be seen as providing evidence of 
a desire not to encourage reception,”76 while the requirement of 
prior notice renders quick and effective recovery of collateral almost 
impossible. Thus, the UK seems to have picked the worst of both 
worlds, for it overemphasizes the importance of prior-notice, which 
characterizes civilian jurisdictions, and suffers from the lack of clear 
standards, giving rise to the same criticism heard in the U.S. 
The UK is now part of the trend where instead of adding clarity to 
the standard, to ease the use of self-help remedies, the legislators 
take the view that it is easier to render it unusable.  
C. Self-Help Repossession in Civilian Jurisdictions Today 
Recent development in secured transactions law reform shows 
further steps in civil law countries where self-help repossession 
started being introduced. However, the “without breach of peace 
standard,” which is the center of this article, is either removed or 
                                                                                                             
 75. Partial compliance is insufficient. See Price v. Romilly [1960] 1 WLR 
1360 (QB) (Eng.). 
 76. BRIDGE, supra note 61, at 122. 
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modified. The question that follows is whether the fact that self-help 
repossession, as designed under Article 9, is stripped of its major 
features when incorporated into a civil law system turned it into a 
different legal device.  
The question is worth addressing before moving into the analy-
sis of the two selected civilian jurisdictions. Self-help repossession 
as a non-judicial enforcement mechanism developed in United 
States case law and was statutorily recognized under UCC Article 9. 
Its essential components under Article 9 are: (a) default, (b) taking 
of the property by the secured creditor without the assistance of a 
state official and without notice to the debtor and (c) observance of 
the “without breach of peace standard.”  
The authors argue that in general, the defining element of self-
help repossession is the absence of a state official in the enforcement 
(police, bailiff of the judiciary) and the secured creditor’s right to 
take possession of the collateral.77 Therefore, the fact that in Roma-
nia, the secured creditor serves notice to the debtor before reposses-
sion as opposed to the approach in the US, does not mean that the 
device is less of a self-help mechanism. Rather, the notice require-
ment entails a consequence on the efficiency of the device. 
Hungary presents a unique experience as discussed later where not 
only should the creditor provide notice, but also must request the 
debtor to release possession of the collateral. The creditor must quit 
the procedure if the debtor refuses to surrender the collateral volun-
tarily. With this background, the coming sections analyze in detail 
how self-help repossession is enshrined in the laws of Hungary and 
Romania.  
 
                                                                                                             
 77. See Douglas Ivor Brandon et al., Self-Help: Extrajudicial Rights, 
Privileges and Remedies in Contemporary American Society, 37 VAND. L. REV. 
845, 850 (1984). See also STĂNESCU, supra note 23, at 8. “Self-help is therefore 
a legally recognized extrajudicial alternative to traditional judicial reme-
dies.” (emphasis in original) Id. 
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1. Hungary: Self-Help Repossession or Merely an Out of Court 
Enforcement Procedure? 
The Hungarian Civil Code of 2013 (HUCC) generally bans self-
help remedies though allowing exceptions which must be expressly 
provided for by law: “Unless otherwise provided for by law, the 
rights afforded in this Act may be enforced by way of judicial pro-
cess.”78 The prohibition of private justice in Hungary is affirmed by 
the criminal code, which criminalizes, among others, the use of 
force to enforce lawful or allegedly lawful pecuniary demands, ex-
cept when the use or threat of use of force constitutes an authorized 
means of enforcement of claim.79 It is within this context that 
whether self-help repossession is permitted under Hungarian law 
and under what conditions should be examined.  
In Hungary, self-help repossession occurred in practice some-
time before the enactment of the HUCC80 despite the absence of 
regulation.81 The HUCC, which represents a major step forward in 
the evolution of the Hungarian secured transactions law, introduced 
an out-of-court enforcement procedure. Whether the new out-of-
court procedure amounts to self-help repossession and whether it is 
as efficient are debatable issues. 
                                                                                                             
 78. See PTK., bk. I, § 1:6. 
 79. 2012. évi C. törvény a Büntető Törvénykönyvről (Act C of 2012 on the 
Criminal Code). Section 368 of the Hungarian Criminal Code, which is captioned 
“Private Justice,” provides as follows:  
(1) A person who, by force or by threat of force, with the purpose of 
enforcing his lawful or allegedly lawful pecuniary demand, compels an-
other person to do, not to do, or to endure something, is guilty of a felony 
punishable by imprisonment between one to five years. (2) The penalty 
shall be imprisonment between two to eight years if private justice is 
committed: a) by displaying a deadly weapon; b) by carrying a deadly 
weapon; c) in a gang; d) against a person incapable of self-defense. (3) 
Where the use of force or threat of force constitutes an authorized means 
of enforcement of a claim, it shall not be construed as private justice. 
BTK., ch. XXXV, § 368. 
 80. Horváthová et al., supra note 55, at 3.  
 81. Id. at 3.  
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The relevant Hungarian version of out-of-court enforcement of 
security right has four essential defining features. These are: (a) de-
fault of the debtor (b) the creditor’s right to request release of pos-
session of the collateral for the purpose of disposition (c) notice (ten 
days for movable collateral and twenty days for immovable collat-
eral) and (d) the debtor’s duty to surrender the collateral and refrain 
from conduct that prevents the secured creditor from selling the col-
lateral.82 These four essential features of the HUCC private enforce-
ment of security interest raise several concerns regarding the possi-
bility to conduct private enforcement successfully.  
First, the procedure does not seem to be self-help repossession 
at all because it does not entitle the secured creditor to take posses-
sion of the collateral. It merely entitles the secured creditor to re-
quest the release of the possession of the collateral by the debtor, 
which was possible even in the absence of a specific provision to 
that effect. One may wonder what happens if the debtor refuses to 
comply with the request. Since Hungarian law prohibits the use of 
force or the threat to use force in view of enforcement, it seems rea-
sonable to conclude that if the debtor refuses to surrender the collat-
eral, the creditor has no other option than judicial enforcement. This 
                                                                                                             
 82. PTK., bk. V, ch. XXVII, § 5:132(1)-(3): 
[Right of possession of the pledged property]  
(1) Following the effective date of the right to satisfaction, the lien holder 
shall have the right to take possession of the pledged property for the 
purpose of sale, and, to this end, to call the lienor to release the pledged 
property into his possession by the time limit specified.  
(2) For compliance with the request of possession a time limit justified 
by the circumstances shall be given, of at least ten days in the case of 
movable properties and at least twenty days for real estate properties. A 
residential property shall be surrendered fully vacated within a time limit 
of at least three months.  
(3) Following the effective date of the right to satisfaction, upon the lien 
holder’s request the lienor shall release the pledged property in his pos-
session to the lien holder within the prescribed time limit for the purpose 
of sale, to permit the lien holder to take possession of the pledged prop-
erty, and shall refrain from any conduct aimed at preventing the lien 
holder from carrying out the sale.  
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does not fit the definition of self-help repossession where the credi-
tor is at least allowed to take the collateral without the consent of 
the debtor as long as it is done in a peaceful manner.  
The second point is that the secured creditor has the right to re-
quest the release of the collateral for disposition. Considering that 
the enforcement right presupposes disposition, the fact that the rel-
evant HUCC provision explicitly refers to “disposition” as the rea-
son for which the creditor can request the release of the collateral 
implies that if the creditor is not able to dispose of the collateral 
immediately, there is no right to take the possession of the collat-
eral.83 The problem with this approach is that it is practically infea-
sible to make the request for taking the possession of the collateral 
conditional to the immediate sale of the collateral. The practical in-
convenience of this provision stems from the fact that the market 
demand for the collateral might not be readily available and the cred-
itor may not be certain as to whether he or she can dispose of the 
collateral.84 Hence, either the creditor has to market the collateral 
while it is in the debtor’s possession and request the release of pos-
session after locating a buyer or not exercise his or her right at all.  
The third and overarching point regarding the HUCC private en-
forcement provision is whether the provision can be used to carry 
out extra-judicial enforcement and whether it is efficient. The 
HUCC imposes the duty on the creditor, to serve notice to the debtor 
before the repossession takes place. The notice is supposed to in-
form the debtor of the potential enforcement through repossession 
and give the debtor the chance to rectify the default, an approach 
similar to UK law. If the debtor does not rectify the default under 
the HUCC, the creditor can request the surrender of possession, 
which the debtor can either reject or comply with. Hence, whether 
the extra-judicial repossession is possible depends on the voluntary 
                                                                                                             
 83. See Tibor Tajti (Thaythy), Security Rights & European Insolvency 
Regulation, Report for Central and Eastern Europe: Focus on Hungary, 
Lithuania and Poland 48 (2016), https://perma.cc/P2ZT-S7FH. 
 
 84. Id. 
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surrender by the debtor of the collateral. Nevertheless, the assump-
tion that a defaulting debtor would voluntarily surrender the collat-
eral seems naïve. Even if the debtor is willing to do so, the creditor 
can repossess the collateral only if he or she is in the position, thus 
putting another hurdle on the possibility of repossessing the collat-
eral.  
Based on the preceding analysis it can be concluded that the 
HUCC extra-judicial enforcement is not self-help repossession. It is 
rather an out-of-court enforcement process that gives the creditor 
and the debtor the chance to avoid court proceedings, but denies the 
creditor any chance of conducting non-consensual repossession. 
Therefore, the “without breach of peace standard” that is supposed 
to tackle abusive practices is irrelevant to the HUCC provision gov-
erning out-of-court enforcement due to the way the procedure is de-
fined. The authors argue that the HUCC makes self-help device im-
potent and compels the secured creditor to resort to judicial enforce-
ment. Consequently, it is legitimate to conclude that the provision 
governing private enforcement of security interests in Hungary does 
not serve its intended purpose.  
2. Romania: A Toned-Down Type of Self-Help Repossession? 
When Romania decided to reform its secured transaction law in 
1999, the proposed text was almost an identical translation of UCC 
Article 9.85 Upon the debtor’s default, the secured party was entitled 
to “take possession of the collateral or its proceeds by peaceful 
means,” with “no notice . . . to the debtor before taking posses-
sion.”86 However, the secured creditor had an obligation “not [to] 
breach the peace, use physical force or intimidation, or resort to any 
                                                                                                             
 85. The proposed law expressly mentioned U.C.C. section 9-503 (currently 
section 9-609) as a source of inspiration for article 36. See Tit. VI, ch. 3, art. 36 
of Law 99/1999 on Measures for Accelerating Economic Reform published in the 
Official Gazette no. 236/27.05.1999, repealed and replaced by Tit. XI, C. Civ. 
published in the Official Gazette no. 505/15.07.2011, available at https://perma 
.cc/3Y9U-DN6V. 
 86. Id. at art. 36, para. 1. 
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other method designed to coerce the debtor at the time the secured 
party takes possession.”87 Thus, one could notice several limits im-
posed on the creditor: a) limits related to public order, b) limits re-
lated to violence (whether physical or verbal), c) limits related to 
intimidation, and d) limits related to any other means of coercion. 
Together combined they represented a big difference from the 
American model, where the sole limit imposed by the law is the 
“without breach of peace.” It is inferred that by doing so, the Roma-
nian legislator attempted “to classify, even if not clarify,”88 the ex-
perience of the vast US case law, although, in the authors’ opinion, 
this contention has little support. 
Following the approach of Article 9, the proposed law did not 
define “breach of peace,” although one may argue that the insertion 
of limits, like in Louisiana, had the purpose to ease somehow the 
task of practitioners. The drafters’ commentary, although emphasiz-
ing the importance of repossession in reducing time and costs of de-
faulted credit recovery, also left untackled the issue of “breach of 
peace.” It merely mentions that the legal provisions “aim at preserv-
ing a clear distinction between the peaceful means agreed to be-
tween creditor and debtor and the use of force requiring intervention 
of the state to ensure lawful application of force,”89 an explanation 
hardly sufficient to clarify the practical issues posed by the novel 
remedy of self-help repossession in a civilian country. Moreover, if 
in the US, the lack of definition may be substituted by the ability of 
American courts to create law, whereas Romanian courts can only 
interpret it.90  
                                                                                                             
 87. Id. at art. 36, paras. 1-2. 
 88. RADU RIZOIU, GARANŢIILE REALE MOBILIARE: O ABORDARE 
FUNCŢIONALĂ—ANALIZA ECONOMICĂ A DREPTULUI GARANŢIILOR REALE—
INTRODUCERE ÎN REGIMUL JURIDIC AL IPOTECILOR MOBILIARE 597 (2011). 
 89. For commentary on art. 36 of the proposed law, see Nuria de la Peña & 
Heywood Fleisig, Romania: Draft Law on Security Interests in Personal Property 
and Commentaries (Ctr. for the Economic Analysis of Law, 1999), https://perma 
.cc/NH2C-NFHB. 
 90. STĂNESCU, supra note 23, at 114 nn. 79-80. 
2017] CIVIL LAW SYSTEMS & UCC ARTICLE 9 131 
 
 
 
Additional problems stemmed out of the translation of the pro-
posed law. The legislators translated “breach of peace” as “tulbu-
rarea ordinii publice” which means “disturbance of public order.”91 
As the literature emphasized: 
[T]he peaceful character of repossession is closely related to 
non-disturbance of public order. In other words, the right of 
the creditor to repossess the collateral is strongly bound by 
the right of each citizen to live in a climate of social peace. 
The public interest prevails over the private one, for Roma-
nian law protects mere possession, even in the absence of a 
title. Thus, the maintenance of the status quo regarding pos-
session was more important when it came to preserving the 
public order.92  
The conclusion is that in Romania, the analysis of repossession 
cases was not to be regarded as “a conflict between two private in-
terests (the creditor’s v. the debtor’s) but between a private interest 
versus a public one which means that the law was not defending a 
debtor’s right, but only social peace.”93 
However, leaving the concept of “breach of peace” undefined by 
the legislator was not the only problem. The peculiar translation 
adopted by the Romanian law also posed a great deal of practical 
issues since aiding standards or directions existed not as much in its 
civil law, but in its criminal law.94 One thing is certain, due to the 
translation and the division of limits adopted by Law 99/1999, when 
Romanians and Americans discuss “breach of peace” they do not 
mean the same thing.95 
                                                                                                             
 91. For the implementation of the proposed article 36, see art. 63(2) of Law 
99/1999. 
 92. RIZOIU, supra note 88, at 593.  
 93. Id. 
 94. “Tulburarea linistii publice apare intotdeauna atunci când sunt inculcate 
norme imperative din dreptul penal sau cel contravențional.” (“Disturbance of 
public order appears always when mandatory rules of criminal or misdemeanors 
law are breached.”) Radu Rizoiu, Garantie reala mobiliara. Executare prin 
mijloace pașnice. Intelesul noțiunii “in mod pașnic,” 2 REVISTA ROMÂNĂ DE 
DREPT PRIVAT 6-8 (2008).  
 95. “[N]u putem sa confundam breach of peace cu încălcarea linistii 
publice.” RIZOIU, supra note 88, at 597. 
132 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 10 
 
 
 
Because criminal law deals with mandatory rules of behavior, 
any crime or misdemeanor occurring during self-help repossession 
would remove its peaceful character. In Romanian criminal law, the 
“disturbance of public order” has a double meaning: either produc-
ing a public scandal, or damaging moral standards. As a rule, public 
scandal means a serious breach of public peace. In the area of self-
help repossession this would imply: a public scandal caused by the 
repossession of the collateral despite protests of third parties (such 
as neighbors or relatives of the debtors, or simply members of the 
community), acts which could not be circumscribed to violence or 
intimidation against the debtor himself, and which would never be 
sanctioned under the American definition of breach of peace. How-
ever, this result will affect the peaceful character of repossession 
only at the time of repossession and not afterwards. Thus, for exam-
ple, in the case where the creditor peacefully repossessed a collateral 
consisting of a vehicle and afterwards, while driving the vehicle, 
committed a misdemeanor related to driving on public roads, the re-
spective misdemeanor will not affect the peaceful character of the 
repossession.96 
Unfortunately, not even by referring to criminal law standards 
does the issue of defining “disturbance of public order” become eas-
ier. Rizoiu showed that the concept differs from one normative act 
to the other97 and generally has a very wide coverage. Thus, he at-
tempted to adapt these concepts to the needs of secured transactions 
law, by stating that “disturbance of public order” is nothing more 
than an intentional tortious act and that any act that causes a disturb-
ance of the public order must have a close tie to the collateral.98 Ei-
ther way, the tortious act must be sanctioned not only by compen-
sating the loss of the debtor, but also by sanctioning the creditor in 
order to deter similar acts from being committed in the future or by 
                                                                                                             
 96. Rizoiu, supra note 94, at 8. 
 97. For a thorough analysis of the concept throughout Romanian law, see 
RIZOIU, supra note 88, at 597-601. 
 98. Id. at 602-04. 
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other persons. This would explain the choice of the Romanian leg-
islator to include, for the first time in history, severe civil penalties 
payable to the debtor.99 
A question which could be raised is the one concerning abuse of 
rights. Although the law gave the right to the secured party (and its 
agents) to take possession of the collateral upon the debtor’s default, 
it is obvious that the said right may not be exercised outside its 
boundaries. The legal interdiction to “disturb the public order” was 
to set precisely the internal boundaries for self-help repossession. 
Thus, a secured creditor who resorts to self-help repossession must 
take all necessary precautions to avoid the “disturbance of public 
order.”100 According to the Romanian criminal law definition, the 
“disturbance of public order” is different from the “without breach 
of peace standard” as defined by American courts. Therefore, the 
Romanian court’s task of finding a balance between the right of the 
secured creditor to take back the collateral (as fast and as cheap as 
possible), the rights of the society to public order, and the rights of 
non-parties to the security agreements to not be affected by any re-
possession attempts is seriously impaired.  
By referring to “disturbance of public order” as a criminal law 
concept, it appears that under Romanian law the rights of the secured 
creditor stretched only until they conflicted with rights of third par-
ties. This is a very different result than the approach of the U.S. 
courts where it was held in numerous cases that only directly affect-
ing the debtor may be considered in order to impair self-help repos-
session.101 In the absence of relevant Romanian court cases, it is dif-
ficult to say whether the aforementioned theoretical conclusion is 
confirmed by practice, however, such absence cannot constitute 
proof to the contrary either.  
                                                                                                             
 99. Arts. 87-88 of Law 99/1999. 
 100. RIZOIU, supra note 88, at 594.  
 101. See STĂNESCU, supra note 23, at 122-23, especially the cases in nn. 123-
24. 
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In 2011, Romania changed its Civil Code and, together with it, 
its secured transactions law. Law 99/1999 was repealed and most of 
its provisions were included in the New Civil Code (NCC). The pro-
visions of articles 2429 to 2441 of NCC now govern self-help re-
possession. Concerning breach of peace, the NCC specifically men-
tions that the creditor is banned from disturbing public order and 
peace, and from resorting to any direct or indirect means of coercion, 
even if his or her acts would not qualify as criminal offenses.102 It 
was inferred that despite changes in the wording, the effects of the 
new law are entirely similar to the previous one.103 
However, a major change did occur. Unlike the Law 99/1999, 
the NCC imposed a requirement for the creditor to serve a prior no-
tice, through a bailiff, of his or her intention to repossess to the 
debtor.104 Although being in trend with most of the European re-
formed systems105 or the suggestions of the DCFR,106 the notice re-
quirement undermines one of the main advantages of self-help re-
possession by removing the element of surprise.  
Thus, Romanian law moved away from American law, which 
does not require any notice to the debtor regarding self-help repos-
session107 and took a serious step back towards the over-protection-
ism of the debtor witnessed in the UK. According to American lit-
erature, the debtor was not to be informed of the creditor’s actions 
and intentions regarding the collateral, after the debtor’s default. 
The simple logic behind it was to enable the creditor to repossess 
the collateral fast and with avoidance of any physical deterioration 
or loss of market value. At the same time, the debtor was precluded 
from hiding or displacing the collateral, once informed of the up-
coming repossession.  
                                                                                                             
 102. Art. 2440 (2), C. Civ.  
 103. RIZOIU, supra note 88, at 623. 
 104. Art. 2440 (1), C. Civ.  
 105. Tibor Tajti, Post-1990 Secured Transaction Law Reforms in Central and 
Eastern Europe, II SZEGEDI KÖZJEGYZŐI KÖZLÖNY 1, 8 (2013). 
 106. See infra section VIII. B. 
 107. GRANT GILMORE, 2 SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 1213 
(photo. reprt. 1999) (1965). 
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By introducing the requirement of prior notice, the Romanian 
legislator now gives the debtor the upper hand, for he or she is em-
powered to paralyze any repossession attempts through private 
means. In other words, it appears that the Romanian legislator did 
its best to limit to a maximum extent (even if not by specifically 
saying so) the usage of a self-help remedy. Given the code’s silence 
with respect to the nature and content of the notice, the creditor may 
be able to serve it on the very same day of the repossession,108 but 
it is undeniable that a resort to self-help repossession is currently 
seriously impaired in Romania. Despite this, Romania remains one 
of the few civilian systems that introduced and maintained the re-
quirement of “without breach of peace” standard in relation to self-
help repossession.  
VII. SELF-HELP REPOSSESSION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LEGAL IN-
STRUMENTS 
International legal instruments governing secured financing rep-
resent the attempt to accommodate common law and civil law tradi-
tions for the sake of promoting efficiency, predictability, and secu-
rity in cross-border transactions, leading to the convergence of the 
two legal traditions. The negotiation of an international legal instru-
ment governing cross-border commerce typically leads to an ac-
ceptable compromise between both legal traditions. The Cape Town 
Convention (CTC) and the Draft Common Frame of Reference 
(DCFR) will be reviewed in this section. While the CTC is an inter-
national worldwide legal instrument, the DCFR is a European one, 
intended to pave the way to a European Civil Code.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 108. STĂNESCU, supra note 23, at 127. 
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A. Replacing the “Breach of Peace Standard” by Contractual 
Clause for Sui Generis Industry: The Cape Town Convention 
The central objective of the CTC is to facilitate financing of high 
value mobile equipment by providing the legal framework for cre-
tion, registration, and enforcement of international interests recog-
nized by signatory parties.109 As of 2017, the CTC has 73 contract-
ing parties from both civil law and common law countries.110 In the 
light of the multi-jurisdictional legal and political efforts put into 
designing the convention,111 and the diversity of the membership to 
the convention, it is fair to say that it represents a major rapproche-
ment of the civil and common law legal traditions.  
The enforcement regime of the CTC is characterized by wide 
room for party autonomy.112 Unless the member state in question 
has opted out, the secured creditor (chargee) can take possession of 
                                                                                                             
 109. See Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, opened 
for signature Nov. 16, 2001, 2307 U.N.T.S. 285. The recitals state:  
THE STATES PARTIES TO THIS CONVENTION, Aware of the need 
to acquire and use mobile equipment of high value or particular eco-
nomic significance and to facilitate the financing of the acquisition and 
use of such equipment in an efficient manner, Recognising the ad-
vantages of asset-based financing and leasing for this purpose and desir-
ing to facilitate these types of transaction by establishing clear rules to 
govern them, Mindful of the need to ensure that interests in such equip-
ment are recognised and protected universally, Desiring to provide broad 
and mutual economic benefits for all interested parties, Believing that 
such rules must reflect the principles underlying asset-based financing 
and leasing and promote the autonomy of the parties necessary in these 
transactions, Conscious of the need to establish a legal framework for 
international interests in such equipment and for that purpose to create 
an international registration system for their protection, Taking into con-
sideration the objectives and principles enunciated in existing Conven-
tions relating to such equipment, Have agreed upon the following provi-
sions . . . .  
 110. Id., Chart of signatures, ratifications and accessions, UNIDROIT, avail-
able at https://perma.cc/DRY3-4ZT4.  
 111. Legal Advisory Panel to the Aviation Working Group , Self-Instructional 
Materials: For Use by the Cape Town Convention Academic Project (2014), 
https://perma.cc/XF4C-GMQE. In particular, see Introduction.  
 112. Anna Veneziano, Security Interests Burdening Transport Vehicles – The 
Cape Town Convention and Its Implementation in National Law, in Italian Na-
tional Reports, International Congress of Comparative Law, Vienna 7 (2014), 
https://perma.cc/ES2N-MMXE.  
2017] CIVIL LAW SYSTEMS & UCC ARTICLE 9 137 
 
 
 
the collateral upon the debtor’s default.113 The remedy for the seller 
with retention of title or the lessor is slightly different unless those 
are recharacterized as security interests in the relevant domestic se-
cured transactions law.114 As this article does not dwell upon the 
analysis of the slight differences in the remedies available to the 
chargee, and conditional seller (or lessor), it focuses solely on the 
self-help remedy, where it is available, and the conditions under 
which it is exercised.  
Self-help repossession is possible under the convention and the 
Aircraft Protocol subject to the consent of the debtor.115 No specific 
formality is required to secure the consent of the debtor.116 The 
debtor’s consent can be secured before or after default.117 However, 
the “without breach of peace” standard has not been imported by the 
CTC regime. Neither does it subject self-help repossession to prior 
notice. This is rather a unique approach to self-help repossession 
compared to Article 9 or the approach prevailing in civil law coun-
tries. It is different from Article 9 due to the lack of “without breach 
of peace” standard. It is different from the typical civil law approach, 
for instance, Louisiana and Romania because it does not require no-
tice to be served to the debtor. The requirement of consent of the 
                                                                                                             
 113. Id. at 7. Article 8(1)(a) of the Cape Town Convention states the follow-
ing:  
(1) In the event of default as provided in Article 11, the chargee may, to 
the extent that the chargor has at any time so agreed and subject to any 
declaration that may be made by a Contracting State under Article 54, 
exercise any one or more of the following remedies: (a) take possession 
or control of any object charged to it . . . . 
Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, art. 8(1)(a), opened 
for signature Nov. 16, 2001, 2307 U.N.T.S. 285. 
 114. Article 10 deals with remedies available to conditional sellers and lessors. 
For further discussion, see ROY GOODE, CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL 
INTERESTS IN MOBILE EQUIPMENT AND PROTOCOL THERETO ON MATTERS 
SPECIFIC TO AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT: OFFICIAL COMMENTARY 58-59 (3d ed., Int’l 
Inst. for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) 2013).  
 115. Art. 8(1) and the Aircraft Protocol Article XI (2) Alternative A Protocol 
to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Spe-
cific to Aircraft Equipment, art. XI(2), Alternative A, opened for signature Nov. 
16, 2001, 2367 U.N.T.S. 517. 
 116. GOODE, supra note 114, at 59.  
 117. Id. 
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debtor potentially undermines the efficiency, especially when the 
consent has not been secured before default. 
Given that the convention along with the protocols target an in-
dustry of professionals with comparable bargaining position (e.g., 
airlines companies), the CTC’s version of self-help repossession is 
easy to apply and probably sound from a policy perspective. While 
promoting its foundational policy (i.e., efficient enforcement of se-
curity rights), it also strikes the balance between the rights of the 
creditor, on the one hand, and the debtor’s, on other hand, by sub-
jecting repossession to prior consent of the debtor. The midway so-
lution between Article 9 and the civil law approach adopted by the 
CTC and its protocol appears to be reasonable in its own context. To 
a large extent, this convention governs sui generis industries such as 
airlines and big technology companies. In these fields, it can safely 
be assumed that the parties have comparable bargaining powers and 
the likelihood of imposition of a standard contract clause subjecting 
one party to an abusive term is low. Hence, once the parties have 
agreed to self-help repossession in the security agreement or subse-
quently, the convention assumes that ex post facto judicial control is 
not necessary.  
This solution is not fit for domestic secured transactions law be-
cause the dynamics involved are different. Domestic secured trans-
actions law must address the risk of potential abuse on consumer-
debtors. This is not to suggest that a business to business relationship 
is immune from the risk of abuse, but the concern is higher in busi-
ness to consumer transactions. Moreover, in the industries targeted 
by the convention, for instance airlines, one can reasonably expect 
the parties to deal with enforcement issues in light of protecting their 
reputation. Hence, the possibility of self-help repossession to occur 
in practice is likely to be low. Domestic secured transactions en-
forcement, comparatively speaking, presumes frequent repossession 
in situations where, due to the diversity of the creditors and the debt-
ors, an aggressive enforcement mechanism is inevitable, and the 
concomitant risks are higher. But the convention is another good 
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example of the reluctance in adopting the “breach of peace stand-
ard.” 
The authors are aware that with the coming into force of the pro-
tocol governing security interests in high value agricultural, mining, 
and construction equipment, the same policy is likely to be main-
tained. With respect to smallholder agricultural financing, it is pos-
sible to make the argument that the farmers deserve better protection 
in cases of enforcement. Either way, the UNIDROIT self-help re-
possession mechanisms appear to be reasonable in its limited con-
text. 
B. The Draft Common Frame of Reference 
Drafted and prepared by the elite of the European legal scholars 
and professionals, the DCFR was meant to be a model for a future 
European Civil Code, a project no longer on the political agenda. 
However, the importance and the magnitude of this document 
should not be underrated, for it provides a glimpse into the possible 
future of self-help repossession in Europe. The issue of default and 
enforcement of secured transactions in movable assets is addressed 
in Chapter 7 of Book IX, where the drafters stated from the outset 
that “in many European countries there is an increasing movement 
seeking an alternative to traditional methods of enforcing security 
rights because of its delays, costs and often disappointing re-
sults,”118 a statement which remained bold and revolutionary, but 
may not be supported by the legal provisions that followed.119 
The DCFR places the entire burden on the creditor, overlooking 
not only his or her secured status, but also the fact that once default 
                                                                                                             
 118. STUDY GROUP ON A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE & RESEARCH GROUP ON EC 
PRIVATE LAW (ACQUIS GROUP), PRINCIPLES, DEFINITION AND MODEL RULES OF 
EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR) 5614 
(Christian von Bar & Eric Clive eds, Oxford Univ. Press 2010) [hereinafter 
STUDY GROUP 2010]. 
 119. On the failure of the DCFR to change the general European approach to 
self-help remedies, see STĂNESCU, supra note 23, at 42-47. 
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has occurred, he or she is also strategically the weaker party in rela-
tion to a defaulting debtor. First, the DCFR requires the creditor to 
serve a minimum 10 days prior notice to consumers whenever it in-
tends to repossess the collateral,120 which basically strips reposses-
sion of both the element of surprise and the leverage factor, since 
the debtor is granted enough time to preclude the creditor from 
reaching the collateral. Interestingly, the commentary addresses the 
issue of debtor’s remedies against secured creditors who fail to send 
notice, but does not consider any remedy for the secured creditor 
who, because of proper notice, finds him or herself in the position 
of not being able to recover the collateral. The DCFR obviously fails 
to provide a balance between the interest of the creditors’ expecta-
tion of fast and cheap recovery and those of the debtors’ expectation 
for adequate consumer protection against abuse, a balance which 
lies at the core of UCC Article 9 when it comes to self-help repos-
session. 
In fact, the DCFR bans self-help repossession in its entirety even 
though it does not state it openly.121 This unfortunate result is indi-
rectly achieved by the provision which requires the secured creditor 
to obtain the consent of the debtor, at the time of repossession. Fail-
ure to obtain such a voluntary relinquishment of the collateral forces 
the secured creditor to stop any attempts and switch to the judicial 
remedies available. Thus, as if the notification requirement was not 
enough, under the provisions of the DCFR, the creditor does not 
benefit from the possibility given to U.S. creditors to avoid the lack 
                                                                                                             
 120. STUDY GROUP 2010, supra note 118, at 4701, bk. IX, ch. 7, § 1, art. IX.–
7:107 (“Enforcement notice to consumer”). 
 121. The commentary to article IX.–7:201 states as follows:  
The dilemma for the secured creditor arises if, as happens frequently, the 
security provider who is in possession of the encumbered assets and who 
may need them urgently for the continuation of its production or sales or 
other commercial activity, refuses or attempts to delay the transfer of 
possession. This Article is designed to solve this dilemma. Without say-
ing so expressly, self-help by the secured creditor is clearly excluded 
(emphasis added). 
STUDY GROUP 2010, supra note 118, at 4707, bk. IX, ch. 7, § 2, subsec. 1, art. 
IX.–7:201 (“Creditor’s right to possession of corporeal asset”) cmt. C.  
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of debtor’s consent by repossessing the collateral from public places 
or by avoiding the debtor’s presence. In other words, if the debtor 
does not expressly consent to repossession, the creditor must always 
resort to judicial enforcement. This is an obvious contradiction of 
the aforementioned premise according to which, the DCFR recog-
nized the need to provide secured creditors with speedy and efficient 
private enforcement alternatives. 
The DCFR does not mention anywhere the requirement that the 
secured creditor must act in full compliance with the “without 
breaching the peace standard.” However, a comment mentions the 
fact that “the rules of the Article122 proceed on the basis that the 
secured creditor may proceed against the holder of the encumbered 
assets only in a peaceful way. Therefore, the latter’s present or a past 
consent is necessary.”123 The drafters understanding that reposses-
sion by peaceful means equals consent is extremely limitative, es-
pecially by comparison with the U.S. model, or even Romanian law, 
whose approach to what breach of peace means is broader than the 
one in the U.S. Like in the case of the UK or Hungary, the only 
answer to the DCFR’s position was the desire of the drafters to limit 
to the largest extent possible the usage of self-help repossession and 
force the creditor to shift immediately to courts, where all enforce-
ment procedures could be supervised by the judge.  
VIII. JUDICIAL REPOSSESSION 
The central idea behind addressing judicial repossession here is 
to determine whether there are efficient alternatives to self-help re-
possession to justify its mutations in the continental systems. There-
fore, the following subsections investigate whether it is possible to 
judicially repossess the collateral in a swift and less costly manner 
and if so, what are the implications on the way self-help reposses-
sion is regulated? 
                                                                                                             
 122. STUDY GROUP 2010, supra note 118, at 4706, art. IX.–7:201. 
 123. Id. at 5632. 
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A. Judicial Repossession in the U.S. in General  
In the U.S., when the secured party cannot, or does not, want to 
pursue self-help repossession, as an alternative, he or she can resort 
to repossession by judicial action.124 Generally, Article 9 gives the 
secured creditor the right to take possession immediately upon de-
fault. Since the law protects the secured status of the creditor, he or 
she is entitled to take possession of the collateral without involve-
ment of state or court agents, provided there is no breach of peace. 
This would generally save the secured creditor time, effort, and 
money. However, when the debtor resists self-help repossession or 
when the creditor does not want to pursue it,125 the latter must resort 
to judicial measures and obtain a court order for the possession. The 
sheriff then enforces the order. Most states authorize the sheriff to 
use force to take possession,126 a right the secured creditor making 
use of his or her self-help remedy does not have. The most common 
way of obtaining an order is by filing an action for replevin.127 
The mechanism might be familiar to civilian systems as well. 
The secured creditor files a civil action against the debtor and, im-
mediately upon filing, he or she then moves for an order granting 
immediate temporary possession pending the outcome of the case. 
Typically, this does not take more than 10 to 20 days. In some U.S. 
states, the procedure is ex parte which means the debtor may not 
even be informed and the case is solved in a matter of hours.128 In 
                                                                                                             
 124. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, PRINCIPLES OF SECURED 
TRANSACTIONS 221 (2007). 
 125. The creditor might be reluctant in resorting to self-help repossession and 
may thereby wish to avoid the risks of being held liable for potential violations of 
the “without breach of peace” standard. 
 126. LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A 
SYSTEMS APPROACH 42 (7th ed. 2012). 
 127. “By far the most common users of replevin today are secured creditors 
entitled to possession of collateral pursuant to UCC Section 9-609.” Id. at 41. 
 128. See Del’s Big Saver Foods, Inc. v. Carpenter Cook, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 
1071 (W.D. Wis. 1985), in which the secured creditor successfully filed an action 
for replevin without notice to the debtor and obtained a writ of replevin on the 
same day. Later that day, the secured creditor presented the writ to the debtor and 
demanded possession of the collateral under threat that it would return with the 
sheriff for enforcement. The debtor complied and surrendered possession of the 
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order to obtain the writ of replevin, all the creditor needs to establish 
at the hearing is the likeliness that the action will prevail on the mer-
its.129 Usually, the writ is conditioned by the posting of a bond in 
order to protect the debtor in case the creditor’s case will be rejected. 
In theory, the debtor can regain possession of the collateral by post-
ing a similar bond in favor of the creditor, but where the default is 
due to the debtor’s inability to pay the likeliness that the debtor will 
be able to post such bond is low.  
The distinguishing feature of this procedure is its swiftness. 
Once the writ is issued and the collateral is in the creditor’s posses-
sion, the debtor has no reason to defend the action of replevin and 
judgment is entered by default.130 As a result, a secured creditor ob-
tains possession of collateral (provided it is a tangible good) through 
judicial procedure within two or three weeks, after which the credi-
tor can foreclose the collateral by selling it in a commercially rea-
sonable manner as per Article 9. What follows is that over-careful 
secured creditors can choose to resort directly to judicial reposses-
sion, for the procedure is not much lengthier than the self-help rem-
edy and, provided the debtor’s default is real, it poses fewer risks.131 
It might explain, for instance, why self-help repossession maintains 
a limited attraction in Louisiana (being mostly used for repossession 
of vehicles): judicial repossessions are just as fast.  
The main difference between judicial repossession and self-help 
repossession is the involvement of the judiciary, i.e., the court and 
                                                                                                             
collateral. The federal case brought by the debtor alleging violation of the consti-
tutional right to due process was dismissed. Nevertheless, states where no notice 
is required are the exception, not the rule, which means that generally the proce-
dure will not be as fast as the one described here. 
 129. LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 126, at 41. 
 130. Id.  
 131. Courts generally hold that the duty to refrain from breach of the peace 
during repossession is nondelegable, which means that secured creditors who re-
sort to professional repossessors cannot escape liability in case the latter engage 
in abusive practices. In other words, secured creditors cannot insulate themselves 
from the consequences of unlawful repossession by simply externalizing the ser-
vice to a third party. Id. at 43. 
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the sheriff, which makes the procedure relatively longer and, poten-
tially, more expensive. Judicial repossession is safer for the creditor 
because he or she avoids the likelihood of being sanctioned for vio-
lating the “without breach of peace” standard. Nonetheless, com-
pared to ordinary judicial enforcement procedure, judicial reposses-
sion is cheaper and quicker and hence more efficient. Therefore, it 
is an attractive remedy for the secured creditor.  
B. Judicial Repossession in Louisiana 
In Louisiana, the secured creditor can judicially repossess the 
collateral. In other states in the U.S., judicial repossession is exer-
cised mostly through an action for replevin. In Louisiana, it is exer-
cised through executory process under the Code of Civil Procedure: 
“Executory process begins with the filing of a special kind of lawsuit 
where there is no citation and no service of process on the debtor.”132 
Similarly to replevin, after the hearing of petition for executory pro-
cess, the court can order the seizure and sale by the sheriff of the 
collateral.133 
Executory process is faster compared to the ordinary process be-
cause under the former, the collateral after being repossessed by the 
sheriff can be sold without judicial appraisal provided that waiver of 
judicial appraisal has been agreed upon in the security agreement134 
                                                                                                             
 132. Michael H. Rubin & Jamie D. Seymour, Deficiency Judgements: A Lou-
isiana Overview, 69 LA. L. REV. 783, 794 (2009). Article 2631 of the Louisiana 
Code of Civil Procedure states that executory proceedings are “those which are 
used to affect the seizure and sale of property, without previous citation and judg-
ment, to enforce a mortgage or privilege thereon evidenced by an authentic act 
importing a confession of judgment, and in other cases allowed by law.” LA. CODE 
CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 2631. 
 133. Article 2638 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provides that “[i]f 
the plaintiff is entitled thereto, the court shall order the issuance of a writ of sei-
zure and sale commanding the sheriff to seize and sell the property affected by 
the mortgage or privilege, as prayed for and according to law.” LA. CODE CIV. 
PROC. ANN. art. 2638. 
 134. Article 2723 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure states that: 
Prior to the sale, the property seized must be appraised in accordance 
with law, unless appraisal has been waived in the act evidencing the 
mortgage, the security agreement, or the document creating the privilege 
and plaintiff has prayed that the property be sold without appraisal, and 
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and the secured creditor loses its right to deficiency judgement.135 
In order to prove his or her right to the executory process, the cred-
itor must submit the petition along with statutorily required docu-
ments, including, an authentic evidence of the security agree-
ment,136 and a judgement confession.137 Because the virtue of exec-
utory process lies in the fact that it is fast and less expensive, the 
Civil Procedure Code of Louisiana gives the debtor limited de-
fenses,138 giving the secured creditor the benefit of enforcing its 
claim without delay, “[t]hree days, exclusive of holidays, after hav-
ing served the notice of seizure, the sheriff may proceed to have the 
property appraised and advertisements of the sale published.”139  
The current form of enforcement of security rights in Louisiana 
is the result of deliberate and cautious process of weighing various 
                                                                                                             
the order directing the issuance of the writ of seizure and sale has di-
rected that the property be sold as prayed for. There is no requirement 
that seized property subject to a security interest under Chapter 9 of the 
Louisiana Commercial Laws (R.S. 10:9–101, et seq.), be appraised prior 
to the judicial sale thereof. 
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 2723. 
 135. Rubin & Seymour, supra note 132, at 796-97.  
 136. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 2635(A), which states the following:  
In order for a plaintiff to prove his right to use executory process to en-
force the mortgage, security agreement, or privilege, it is necessary only 
for the plaintiff to submit with his petition authentic evidence of: (1) The 
note, bond, or other instrument evidencing the obligation secured by the 
mortgage, security agreement, or privilege. (2) The authentic act of mort-
gage or privilege on immovable property importing a confession of judg-
ment. (3) The act of mortgage or privilege on movable property import-
ing a confession of judgment whether by authentic act or by private sig-
nature duly acknowledged. 
 137. John Pierre & M.R. Franks, The Consequence of Default to the Debtor 
Under Part 5, Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Commercial Laws: A Primer on 
Debtor’s Rights, 18 S.U. L. REV. 21 (1991). See also LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. 
art. 2632: “An act evidencing a mortgage or privilege imports a confession of 
judgment when the obligor therein acknowledges the obligation secured thereby, 
whether then existing or to arise thereafter, and confesses judgment thereon if the 
obligation is not paid at maturity.” 
 138. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2642 limits the defenses avail-
able to the debtor to (1) an injunction against the seizure and sale and (2) a sus-
pensive appeal of the order of seizure and sale. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 
2642. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2751 further limits the grounds 
for granting an injunction to claims that (1) the debt is extinguished, (2) the debt 
is unenforceable, or (3) the incorrect procedure was followed. LA. CODE CIV. 
PROC. ANN. art. 2751. 
 139. George C. Herget, Comment, Execution Sales, 21 LA. L. REV. 235 (1960). 
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interests. To ensure efficient enforcement of security rights and de-
spite the availability of judicial repossession under the executory 
process, Louisiana permitted self-help repossession while delimit-
ing its contours substantially to accommodate it within its civil law 
tradition. Furthermore, despite the narrow scope of self-help repos-
session, Louisiana still subjects self-help repossession to the “breach 
of peace standard” partially defined by statute and subject to further 
ex post facto judicial control. This shows that self-help repossession 
and judicial repossession cannot replace one another, but rather 
complement each other. The presence of efficient judicial reposses-
sion cannot imply that the regulation of self-help repossession 
should be disregarded or that some of its essential elements should 
be taken lightly. 
Is this procedure utilized in continental jurisdictions? If so, does 
that have an implication on the way self-help repossession is regu-
lated? While the presence of an efficient judicial enforcement pro-
cedure, alternative to self-help repossession, can make the latter less 
indispensable, it is not clear to what extent it affects the conditions 
under which self-help repossession can be exercised.  
C. United Kingdom: Return Orders, Transfer Orders, and Writs of 
Delivery  
Generally in English law, in case of default, the secured creditor 
is entitled to seizure of collateral by resorting to self-help remedies 
(recaption).140 Self-help remedies are favored, where available, for 
they are fast, they avoid legal costs, and can bypass procedural and 
substantive law obstacles to a judicial remedy. Matters are some-
what complicated in English law due to the distinction between legal 
and equitable security interests. Yet once the right to take possession 
due to the debtor’s default was expressly reserved in the security 
                                                                                                             
 140. ROY GOODE, GOODE ON COMMERCIAL LAW 121 (5th ed., Ewan 
McKendrick ed. 2016). 
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instrument, it can be exercised regardless of the nature of the secu-
rity interest.141 A secured creditor can seize goods without an order 
of the court, provided there is no breach of peace and there are no 
statutory restrictions.142 For instance, there can be no repossession 
of a good covered by a regulated agreement within the CCA mean-
ing, without a fourteen-day notice to the debtor,143 and court orders 
are required in case the creditor must enter the premises of a debtor 
to repossess goods from the consumer-debtor.144  
Judicial repossession can occur by order of the court, either di-
rectly for possession or for the appointment of a receiver, who will 
have the power to take possession. Furthermore, the CCA provides 
that, in an action brought by the creditor to recover possession of 
goods to which the agreement relates, the court may either make an 
order (a return order) for the return to the creditor of goods to which 
the agreement relates, or make an order (a transfer order) for the 
transfer to the debtor of the creditor’s title to certain goods to which 
the agreement relates (the transferred goods), and return to the cred-
itor of the remained of the goods (a return order).145  
Return or transfer orders have limited power, for they do not al-
low recovery agents to enter the premises of the debtor to recover 
possession of collateral, and do not entitle the holder to seek the as-
sistance of police officers in the process. This is problematic be-
cause the law states that if the debtor fails to comply with the return 
or transfer order, the goods to which the order relates but were not 
returned, the creditor must submit another application to the court. 
As a result of this subsequent judicial action, the court may revoke 
the part of the order that referred to the non-returned goods and order 
                                                                                                             
 141. Id. at 707-08. 
 142. BEALE ET AL., supra note 64, at 623. 
 143. Consumer Credit Act 1974, c. 39, § 88 (UK), available at https://perma.cc 
/4VE6-HWJ5.  
 144. JUDITH TILLSON, CONSUMER AND COMMERCIAL LAW 196 (2011). See 
also Consumer Credit Act 1974, c. 39, §§ 90, 92 (UK), available at 
https://perma.cc/UJU8-96H5 and https://perma.cc/9LX6-HT8Y, respectively. 
 145. Consumer Credit Act 1974, c. 39, § 133(1)(b) (UK), available at 
https://perma.cc/M9TL-UPNZ.  
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the debtor to pay the creditor the unpaid portion of so much of the 
total price as is referable to those goods.146  
The possible effect is staggering, for the (quasi-)secured creditor 
faces the risk to return to the initial situation, where the default of 
the debtor deprived him of both the payments and the collateral. This 
possibility undermines the very idea of secured status. Later on, the 
CCA states that refusal to deliver the goods at the request of the 
creditor may be deemed to be adverse to the creditor and entitles the 
secured creditor to bring a claim for damages in conversion. How-
ever, this does not solve the main issue of non-payment, delays, or 
even impossibility to recover the collateral, for it does not empower 
the creditor or his/her agents to enter the premises of the debtor to 
take possession.147  
Hence, when the goods whereabouts are known and the debtor 
did not comply with the return order, the creditor is entitled to apply 
for a writ of delivery. The procedure requires the creditor to pay an 
additional fee, but once obtained, the writ of delivery allows the 
creditor’s agent to access (on sight of goods) any lock-up, land, or 
garage (provided it is not attached to a dwelling house) and may use 
reasonable force in order to seize the goods.148 At the same time, a 
writ of delivery also entitles the holder to ask for the assistance of 
police officers in the process. They will ensure there is no breach of 
the peace whilst the goods are recovered. The writ takes about 10 
days to obtain and is valid for a year after, which emphasizes the 
risk that within the 10 days period the debtor can move the goods to 
another location and hinder repossession efforts.149 
Unlike the U.S. where judicial repossession is almost as fast as 
the self-help remedy, in the UK, judicial action poses an entire series 
                                                                                                             
 146. Id. at § 133(7). 
 147. On the issue of delays and hardships faced by creditors as well as on the 
alternatives available to them, see Insights: Return of Goods Orders - Under-
standing Your Enforcement Options, OPTIMA LEGAL, June 2015, https://perma.cc 
/VZQ8-979V (last visited June 16, 2017). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
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of risks to the secured creditor, requires significant amount of time, 
additional costs and does not appear to be a viable alternative to self-
help remedies (where they exist). 
D. Hungary: Judicial Enforcement Only 
In Hungary, the secured creditor has the option to enforce its 
security right through judicial or non-judicial means.150 However, 
the HUCC does not contain any special rules regarding judicial re-
possession. Judicial enforcement in general is governed by various 
statutes the most important ones being the Civil Procedure Code151 
and the Act LIII 1994 (Judicial Enforcement Act).152 The closer ex-
amination of the application of judicial enforcement rules in Hun-
gary does not suggest that secured creditors have efficient enforce-
ment mechanism alternatives to self-help repossession that can ren-
der the latter inessential. When non-judicial enforcement under the 
HUCC fails, the secured creditor switches to ordinary judicial en-
forcement process, which is lengthy and costly.153  
According to a report prepared by a practitioner in the year 2017, 
judicial enforcement of a security right takes between several 
months to a year from petitioning for trial to final distribution of 
proceeds of sale depending on the complexity of the case and vari-
ous defenses pleaded by the debtor.154 In a nutshell, in Hungary, 
                                                                                                             
 150. Section 5:126(3) of the Hungarian Civil Code of 2013 states that “The 
lien holder shall have the option to exercise his right to satisfaction either by way 
of judicial enforcement or by means other than by judicial enforcement.” PTK., 
bk. V, tit. VII, ch. XXVII, § 5:126(3). 
 151. 1952. évi III. törvény a Polgári perrendtarásról (Act III of 1952 on the 
Code of Civil Procedure). 
 152. 1994. évi LIII. törvény a bírósági végrehajtásról (Act LIII of 1994 on Ju-
dicial Enforcement). 
 153. See EULER HERMES, Collection Profile: Hungary 5 (2016), available at 
https://perma.cc/Z53N-RP6T. This report states: 
Commencing ordinary legal action in Hungary is not advisable and am-
icable settlement opportunities should always be considered as a major 
alternative to court proceedings. Indeed, the Hungarian judiciary system 
is overall excessively formal and costly, whilst the courts have difficul-
ties coping with the caseload because they are often ill-equipped and 
there is a lack of trained staff. 
 154. Id. 
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there is no judicial repossession procedure comparable to replevin 
or executory process. Consequently, secured creditors in Hungary 
do not reap the privilege offered by security interest, i.e., cheaper 
and speedier enforcement of their claim against the collateral. Due 
to the vigorous conditions under which private enforcement must be 
exercised that effectively forces the secured creditor to resort to or-
dinary judicial process, the advantageous position of the secured 
creditor is undermined by the system, which potentially leads to an 
increase in the cost of credit. 
E. Judicial Repossession in Romania 
The Romanian secured transactions law also establishes the right 
of the creditor to take possession of collateral by private means or 
with the aid of a bailiff.155 Like the U.S. creditor, the Romanian one 
enjoys the right to choose any of the options and he or she is not 
obliged to resort to self-help before employing judicial reposses-
sion.156 The judicial repossession is simple, for there is no court in-
volvement. In fact, the secured creditor can address the bailiff di-
rectly. The only requirement is to attach to the enforcement request 
a copy of the security agreement, a description of the collateral, and 
where the case may be, a certified copy of the filing with the elec-
tronic archive. At the request of the bailiff,157 police officers must 
provide assistance in recovery of the collateral.158 Within 48 hours 
of the creditor’s request, the bailiff must go to the location of the 
collateral,159 take possession, and hand it over immediately to the 
                                                                                                             
 155. Art. 2439, C. Civ. 
 156. Art. 181 of Law 71/2011 for the Implementation of Law 287/2009 re-
garding the Civil Code.  
 157. Article 649 of the New Code for Civil Procedure (“NCCP”) details the 
concrete ways in which agents of public force assist in prompt and effective en-
forcement. 
 158. Art. 2442(2)-(3), C. Civ. 
 159. This article presumes that the location of the collateral is known to the 
enforcement officer, for the obligation to identify it is his or hers and not the cred-
itor’s. In cases where the location is not yet known, the 48-hour term is calculated 
from the moment when the enforcement officer has knowledge of the collateral’s 
location.  
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creditor. An enforcement minute must be drawn up immediately in 
two original copies, one for the bailiff’s file and one to be commu-
nicated to the debtor.160 All expenses generated by the repossession 
effort, as well as transportation, deposit risks, and costs are ad-
vanced by the creditor.161 In cases where the use of force is required 
for taking possession of the collateral, the bailiff is obliged to return 
on the same day with police officers in order to perform the repos-
session.162 No court order or any other administrative act is required 
thereof.163 However, like self-help repossession, judicial reposses-
sion may trigger the liability of the secured creditor in case of a 
breach of provisions concerning repossession.164 
The aforementioned provisions seem to indicate that the bailiff 
is not entitled to resort to the use of public force immediately, but 
must try first to obtain possession peacefully and without police as-
sistance. Only where the use of force is necessary, he or she is re-
quired to return during the same day with police officers to take pos-
session of collateral. Based on the above, it is safe to conclude that 
like in the U.S., judicial repossession constitutes a viable alternative 
to self-help repossession, although we lack hard evidence to sub-
stantiate this theoretical assessment. On paper, it is a fast, ex parte 
procedure, which does not require any court involvement. The only 
potential issues are the expenses which must be advanced by the 
creditor and the lack of knowledge concerning the collateral’s loca-
tion, which may result in prolongation of the procedure. Finally, 
whereas U.S. creditors who wish to avoid any potential liability aris-
ing from the repossession choose judicial repossession, in Romania, 
                                                                                                             
 160. Communication is done in accordance to the provisions of the NCCP. See 
COLECTIV, NOUL COD CIVIL. COMENTARII, DOCTRINĂ ŞI JURISPRUDENŢĂ § 3, 855 
(2012). 
 161. The creditor will recover the expenses generated by judicial repossession 
from the debtor by using the general provisions of the NCCP.  
 162. According to article 2474 of the NCC, failure to return on the same day 
may result in liability for the secured creditor for any damages caused. See 
COLECTIV, supra note 160, at 856. 
 163. Art. 2443, C. Civ. 
 164. Arts. 2474, C. Civ. et seq. 
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creditors who resort to judicial repossession do not insulate the se-
cured creditor from the dire consequences of wrongful repossession.  
IX. CONCLUSION 
This article shows that self-help repossession in civilian systems 
is tainted by internal self-contradictions, with serious implications 
on the success of out-of-court enforcement of security rights. This 
has negative consequences on the possibility of an aggrieved se-
cured creditor to benefit from a swift and least costly recovery of his 
or her claim, thus affecting the very rationale behind security inter-
ests and secured transactions law reform. 
One of the essential elements of self-help repossession under Ar-
ticle 9 is the “breach of peace standard,” which is intended to protect 
debtors from abuses that can occur during self-help repossession. 
Despite its utility, the standard is difficult to determine in many cir-
cumstances, which appears to be the reason continental countries are 
reluctant to embrace it in their secured transactions laws. Instead of 
improving the standard, national laws, including in the UK, and in-
ternational instruments are prone to amend the self-help remedy, by 
creating their own “mutated” forms, or remove it altogether. 
This article argues that serving prior notice contradicts the very 
essence of self-help repossession, thus putting the entire out-of-
court enforcement system under a question mark. Removing or im-
peding out-of-court enforcement by curtailing its features that are 
distinctively necessary for efficient and speedy recovery of the se-
cured creditor’s claims increases the cost of enforcement, which ul-
timately increases the cost of credit and undermines the underlying 
reasons of secured transactions law reforms. 
Implementing self-help repossession requires weighing various 
competing interests. The guiding principles in this regard should be 
striking the balance between efficient enforcement of security rights 
and protecting vulnerable debtors from concomitant risks. Article 9 
offers efficient enforcement of security rights both through its self-
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help repossession provision and judicial repossession that is exer-
cised under common law. Louisiana accepted Article 9 with sub-
stantial modifications because it had a swift and efficient judicial 
repossession in place. Romania carved self-help repossession prob-
ably because it implemented an effective judicial repossession as 
well, while the UK and Hungary desperately need a self-help device 
because their judicial enforcement procedures are long, complex, 
and costly.  
The authors contend that those legal systems that took the initi-
ative to implement a secured transactions regime based on Article 9 
should maintain out-of-court enforcement, in general, and self-help 
repossession, in particular, but also parallel them with tailor-made 
protective measures for debtors against any sort of abuse that may 
be inflicted upon consumer-debtors. Thus, instead of fearing the un-
known—the “without breach of peace” standard—these states 
should learn from the experience of the U.S. and reform the standard 
to increase its practicability and predictability as well as provide the 
courts with clear standards of assessment. 
While the anxiety in bringing the relatively new concept of self-
help repossession is understandable, it is not reasonable to imple-
ment a legal institution that wishes to introduce the benefits of an 
efficient enforcement system, which at the same time negates its 
purpose by placing unnecessary conditions on its practical imple-
mentation. We argue that the Hungarian secured transactions law 
represents a good example of a legal regime that fails to address the 
dilemma, while the experience of Romania shows a cautious ap-
proach to balancing various interests. 
 
